KYC #07

Chilime Hydropower: One power plant, five companies. Where does Chilime’s value really come from?

Chilime built a 22.1 MW plant in 2003 and used it to promote three larger projects, putting in Rs 657 crore and guaranteeing Rs 4,134 crore of their loans. On 26 Aug 2026 a flood stopped the plant and destroyed one of the projects. We followed the money, the guarantees, the floods and every legal matter we could find.

The short version

Chilime is an NEA-controlled company with one 22.1 MW plant and stakes in four hydropower companies. Its own plant earned a steady Rs 64 crore to Rs 75 crore a year.^1,8
It put Rs 657 crore into those companies and lent them Rs 161 crore (mid-July 2025). The cash that has come back is interest on the loans and one Rs 3 crore dividend from its engineering arm.¹
It also guaranteed their EPF loans: Rs 4,134 crore, 3.6 times its own equity. The contingent-liability table in the same accounts shows nil.¹
The flood of 26 Aug 2026 stopped Chilime’s plant, destroyed Rasuwagadhi a second time and cut Sanjen off from the grid. Six people on duty at Chilime went missing; five were found dead.^13,15,23
The group earned Rs 35.9 crore for shareholders in the year to mid-July 2025, about half the company’s own Rs 67.7 crore. Our valuation puts the parts at about Rs 112 a share against Rs 336.70.^1,32

The question: When you buy CHCL, are you buying the electricity a 22.1 MW plant made, or a share in the projects it helped build, and the debts it promised to stand behind?

The numbers

Loans Chilime has guaranteed: Rs 4,134 crore. EPF loans of Sanjen, Madhya Bhotekoshi and Rasuwagadhi at mid-July 2025: 3.6 times Chilime’s equity. The contingent-liability table shows nil.
Listed stakes at market: Rs 1,442 crore. Madhya Bhotekoshi, Sanjen and Rasuwagadhi shares at 16 Oct 2026 closes: 45% of Chilime’s market value.
Group profit for shareholders: Rs 35.9 crore. Year to mid-July 2025, against Rs 67.7 crore for Chilime alone.
Put into the five companies: Rs 657 crore. Shares at cost, mid-July 2025, plus Rs 161 crore lent. Dividends received from them that year: Rs 3 crore, from the engineering company.
Capacity factor: 75.8%. Year to mid-July 2025: 146.8 GWh sold against 193.6 GWh at full output all year. The plant is now at zero.
Price since the flood: -29.1%. Rs 475.10 on 25 Aug 2026 to Rs 336.70 on 16 Oct 2026.

01. One power plant, five companies, and a promise larger than itself

For two decades Chilime was the simplest company on NEPSE: one 22.1 MW plant in Rasuwa, one customer (NEA), one price (Rs 8.17 a unit), and a profit of Rs 64 crore to Rs 75 crore a year.^1,7

It used that plant to build something larger. Through Sanjen, Madhya Bhotekoshi and Rasuwagadhi it promoted 270.3 MW of new capacity. It put Rs 657 crore into shares, lent Rs 161 crore, and guaranteed Rs 4,134 crore of their loans from the Employees Provident Fund, 3.6 times its own equity.¹

The contingent-liability table in the same audited accounts shows nil. The guarantees are disclosed two pages later, in note 25. Both are true statements of what each note covers; together they mean a reader of the balance sheet alone would miss the largest commitment Chilime has made.¹

On 26 Aug 2026 a debris flood down the Bhotekoshi stopped Chilime’s plant, destroyed Rasuwagadhi for the second time in 14 months, and cut Sanjen off from the grid. Six people on duty in Chilime’s powerhouse went missing; five were found dead after 21 days.^13,15,23

This is a Know Your Company file, not a valuation. It says what Chilime is, how it changed, who controls it, what its accounts show and what the record establishes. Our separate valuation asks what the parts are worth.³²

When you buy CHCL, are you buying the electricity a 22.1 MW plant made, or a share in the projects it helped build, and the debts it promised to stand behind?

02. Chilime on one page

The facts a shareholder should be able to repeat from memory, with the basis for each.

Item	Fact	Basis
What it is	An NEA-controlled company that owns a 22.1 MW run-of-river plant in Rasuwa and stakes in four hydropower companies and an engineering firm	Filing
Ownership	NEA 51%; public 49%, including 10% reserved for local people	Filing
Plant	22.1 MW, two Pelton units, underground powerhouse; commercial since 25 Aug 2003; licence to mid-July 2047	Filing
Customer and price	NEA only; Rs 8.17 a unit (regular), Rs 4.08 (excess), unchanged in every year we read	Filing
Revenue and profit (company alone)	Rs 116.76 crore and Rs 72.01 crore, year to mid-July 2026, unaudited	Filing
Equity and book value	Rs 1,175.22 crore; Rs 123.90 a share	Filing
Investments at cost	Rs 659.54 crore (mid-July 2026)	Filing
Guarantees	Rs 4,134 crore of EPF loans plus Rs 132.7 crore to Himalayan Bank (mid-July 2025)	Filing
Plant status	Down since 26 Aug 2026; no restart date, repair cost or insurance claim published	Filing and press
Market	Rs 336.70 (16 Oct 2026); market value Rs 3,194 crore; 2.72 times book	Market data
Legal record	7 matters registered: one concluded (audit opinions), three pending, three unresolved. No court finding against the company found.	Our register

Basis: “Filing” means a document published by the company or an investee; “Our register” is our compilation. Rs crore throughout.^1,8,30

A company that NEA founded to build one plant. Why was it set up that way?

03. The “Chilime model”: NEA’s plant, Nepali money, a share for local people

Chilime was incorporated in 1995 to generate hydropower “by making optimal use of resources within the country”. NEA holds 51%; 49% is the public, including 10% reserved for people in the project area.¹ The power purchase agreement with NEA dates from 11 Asadh 2054 (25 Jun 1997) and the 50-year generation licence from 10 Aug 1997.^1,5

The 1999 detailed design put the cost at Rs 232.32 crore. The plant was finished for Rs 247.79 crore, 6.66% more, and began commercial generation on 25 Aug 2003, 22 months late. The year-to-July 2004 report blames the landslide-prone road (closed at least three months a year), conflict-era limits on blasting and weak rock in 39% of the headrace tunnel.⁷

At mid-July 2004 paid-up capital was Rs 49.22 crore, 99.5% of it NEA’s, with shares for NEA staff and the public still to be sold. The rest came as loans: Citizen Investment Trust lent Rs 38.19 crore as a bridge to the share sales, Himalayan Bank provided an overdraft, Laxmi Bank a short-term loan, and the EPF a loan. The directors thanked NEA for standing guarantee for them.⁷

Keep that last sentence in mind. In 2004 NEA stood behind Chilime’s borrowing. Twenty years later Chilime stood behind its own project companies’ borrowing, on a far larger scale.

The regulator approved a public issue of 23,04,000 shares at Rs 323.70 in May 2009; The Himalayan Times then called Chilime the first hydropower company listed for trading on NEPSE. The issue closed in June 2011.^28,29

A plant that worked. What did Chilime do next?

04. From one plant to a portfolio, and two floods

The record below is dated and sourced. Where documents disagree on a date, the card says so.

1995: The company is formed. Chilime Jalavidhyut Company is incorporated in 1995 to build hydropower with domestic resources. NEA holds 51%. The exact registration date is not in the documents we read.
25 Jun 1997: The power purchase agreement (11 Asadh 2054). NEA agrees to buy all the electricity. In every year we read, regular energy is paid Rs 8.17 a unit and excess energy Rs 4.08: the rate has not escalated since at least the year to mid-July 2019.
10 Aug 1997: A 50-year licence. The generation licence runs from 26 Shrawan 2054 to Ashadh end 2104, mid-July 2047. Under the build-own-operate-transfer terms the plant then passes to the Government. From October 2026 that leaves about 21 years.
25 Aug 2003: Commercial generation begins (8 Bhadra 2060). The 1999 design estimate was Rs 232.32 crore; the plant cost Rs 247.79 crore, 6.66% more, and took 22 months longer than planned. The report blames the Pasang Lhamu highway (closed at least three months a year by landslides), the conflict-era limits on blasting and weak rock in 39% of the headrace tunnel.
2003/04: Built on borrowed guarantees. Paid-up capital was Rs 49.22 crore, 99.5% of it from NEA. Loans came from the Employees Provident Fund, Citizen Investment Trust, Himalayan Bank and Laxmi Bank, and the directors thanked NEA for standing guarantee for them. The first part-year paid a 10% dividend.
19 May 2009: Approval to sell shares to the public. The securities regulator approves a primary issue of 23,04,000 shares at Rs 323.70 (a premium of Rs 223.70). The Himalayan Times calls Chilime the first hydropower company listed for trading on NEPSE. The issue closed in June 2011.
8 Dec 2011: The EPF loan structure for the new projects (2068/08/22). A tripartite loan agreement among the Employees Provident Fund, Chilime and Rasuwagadhi (formed in August 2011) finances the 111 MW project. Sanjen and Madhya Bhotekoshi borrow the same way, and Chilime guarantees all three.
Mar 2021: The plant is rehabilitated. After 17 years of operation the turbines and generators are overhauled, capitalised at INR 4.11 crore plus Rs 0.21 crore, with a bonus to the contractor for a shorter shutdown.
8 Oct 2023: Upper Sanjen (14.8 MW) begins selling power. The first of the three project companies to earn revenue, twelve years after the projects were launched.
31 Dec 2024: Rasuwagadhi (111 MW) and Sanjen (42.5 MW) commissioned. Rasuwagadhi starts commercial generation on 16 Poush 2081. Sanjen’s date is 2081/09/01 (16 Dec 2024) in the project table and 2082/09/01 in the directors’ text of the same report.
Year to Jul 2025: Two subsidiaries become associates. After the boards of Sanjen and Rasuwagadhi changed, Chilime no longer controls them. Their debt (Rs 2,464 crore of group borrowings the year before) leaves the group balance sheet, though the shareholdings and the guarantees do not change.
8 Jul 2025: The first flood (24 Asadh 2082). A glacial-lake flood on the Bhotekoshi floods Chilime’s machine hall: nine days without power, about Rs 0.89 crore of damaged equipment and about Rs 2.8 crore of lost sales. Rasuwagadhi stops for nearly a year.
6 Oct 2025: Madhya Bhotekoshi (102 MW) commissioned. Its own report gives 2082 Asoj 20. Chilime’s annual report gives 2082/07/16 in one table and 2082/07/20 in the text.
14 Jan 2026: 29th annual meeting. Shareholders pass a 4% cash dividend and an 8% bonus. The bonus waited months for the Electricity Regulatory Commission, whose posts were vacant. The group accounts carry a qualified audit opinion.
26 Aug 2026: The second flood (10 Bhadra 2083). A debris flood down the Bhotekoshi buries the access to Chilime’s underground powerhouse. Six people on duty in the control room and at the gate go missing. Rasuwagadhi is destroyed again; 93 of its people are reported missing.
16 to 18 Sep 2026: Five bodies recovered; relief decided. After 21 days a joint team led by the Nepali Army finds five bodies; one employee is still missing. The board grants Rs 5 lakh to each family.
16 Oct 2026: The price. CHCL closes at Rs 336.70, 29.1% below the last close before the flood. No restart date, repair estimate or insurance figure has been published.

Six turning points, with the evidence

1995 to 2003: The “Chilime model”. What happened: NEA builds a 22.1 MW plant through a company it controls, with Nepali capital and a share for local people. The bet: Selling shares to NEA staff, local residents and the public would repay the bridge loans and spread ownership. What it produced: The plant ran from August 2003; it cost 6.66% more than the 1999 estimate and was 22 months late. What it left behind: A plant that earned about Rs 110 crore a year in the years we read, and a model the press said would be repeated at Upper Tamakoshi.
2009 to 2011: A listed hydropower company. What happened: The regulator approves a public issue at Rs 323.70 a share; the issue closes in 2011. The bet: A listed, dividend-paying power company owned mostly by NEA. What it produced: Chilime becomes the hydropower share retail investors in Nepal knew first. What it left behind: Its price has carried that history: at 2.72 times book it is still priced as a growth story.
2011 to 2024: From one plant to four projects. What happened: Chilime promotes Sanjen (57.3 MW), Madhya Bhotekoshi (102 MW) and Rasuwagadhi (111 MW), financed mostly by the EPF and guaranteed by Chilime. The bet: Use a profitable plant’s balance sheet and guarantees to build 270 MW more. What it produced: Chilime put Rs 657 crore into shares at cost and guaranteed Rs 4,134 crore of EPF loans by mid-July 2025. What it left behind: Rasuwagadhi took 13 years from incorporation to commercial operation; capitalised interest made up 42% of what the three owed the EPF.
2023 to 2025: Commissioning, and the accounts change. What happened: Upper Sanjen, Sanjen, Rasuwagadhi and Madhya Bhotekoshi all start selling power between October 2023 and October 2025. The bet: Revenue at last from the projects. What it produced: But interest arrives with it: the group’s profit for shareholders fell to Rs 35.90 crore while the standalone profit held at Rs 67.65 crore. What it left behind: Two of the three left the consolidated accounts when board seats changed, which also took their debt off the group balance sheet.
Jul 2025: The first warning. What happened: A glacial-lake flood stops Chilime for nine days and Rasuwagadhi for nearly a year. The bet: Treated as a one-off: Chilime’s report calls it “unprecedented”. What it produced: Rasuwagadhi lodged a Rs 175 crore insurance claim and returned to full output around the end of June 2026. What it left behind: It was the first of two floods in 14 months.
Aug 2026: The second flood. What happened: The Bhotekoshi debris flood stops Chilime, destroys Rasuwagadhi again, and strands Sanjen’s output. The bet: Of 292.4 MW in the portfolio, only Madhya Bhotekoshi’s 102 MW runs normally. What it produced: The price fell 29.1% by 16 October. What it left behind: The guarantees, the loans to the project companies and the insurance now decide what the shares are worth.

Before the portfolio: how good was the plant itself?

05. A reliable 22.1 MW plant at a price that never moved

The plant has two Pelton units in an underground powerhouse and sells everything to NEA. In the year to mid-July 2025 it sold 146.8 GWh: the contract’s deemed energy of 132.9 GWh at Rs 8.17 and 18.0 GWh of excess at Rs 4.08. Availability was 95.1% and the plant-load factor 83.4%.¹

Year to mid-July	Sold, GWh	Of which excess, GWh	Capacity factor, %	Against deemed energy, %	Revenue per unit, Rs
2075/76	153.8	21.0	79.4	115.7	n/a
2076/77	146.3	13.4	75.6	110.1	n/a
2077/78	148.1	19.9	76.5	111.4	7.62
2078/79	156.1	22.8	80.6	117.4	7.57
2079/80	149.0	21.7	77.0	112.1	7.58
2080/81	141.3	9.4	73.0	106.3	7.90
2081/82	146.8	18.0	75.8	110.4	7.67

Units billed to NEA (revenue notes). Capacity factor = units sold / (22.1 MW x 8,760 hours). Deemed energy = 132.917 GWh a year. Revenue per unit = electricity revenue / units sold. The year to mid-July 2026 is not split in the quarterly; revenue of Rs 116.76 crore implies about 20 GWh of excess energy if regular energy reached the deemed level (our estimate).^1,2,3,4,5,6

Two things stand out. Output is steady: 141 GWh to 156 GWh a year, a capacity factor of 73% to 81%, always above the deemed energy.^1,2,3,4,5,6 And the price is fixed: Rs 8.17 in every year we read, while plant costs rose about 3% a year. Revenue per unit sold stayed between Rs 7.57 and Rs 7.90.¹

Installed capacity is not generation. At full output all year 22.1 MW would make 193.6 GWh; the plant sells about 148 GWh in an average year (five-year mean). Each month offline costs about Rs 9.73 crore of revenue at last year’s run rate.^1,8

The licence ends in mid-July 2047, when the plant passes to the Government. A rehabilitation completed in March 2021, after 17 years, renewed the main equipment.⁵

The plant produced the profit. Where did Chilime put it?

06. Three project companies, one development company, one engineering firm

Click any box. NEA controls Chilime; Chilime holds stakes in each project company alongside NEA, the EPF’s contributors and staff, local bodies, local people and the public.

Nepal Electricity Authority (51%). Holds 51%, appoints the chair and five of eleven directors, buys every unit at the 1997 tariff, and also co-owns each project company (18% of Rasuwagadhi, about 10% of the others).¹
The public (49%). The 19th annual meeting merged the original groups (NEA and Chilime staff, local residents, the general public) into two: promoter and public. The local share is 10%. Holders above 1% are not listed in the report we read.¹
The board of eleven (9 of 11 seats filled). Four public directors have sat since June 2015, in a third term. Both independent seats are vacant. Meeting allowances in the year to mid-July 2025 were Rs 22.0 lakh for all directors.¹
Chilime plant, 22.1 MW. Sold 146.8 GWh to NEA in the year to mid-July 2025 for Rs 112.57 crore. Its underground powerhouse was filled with debris on 26 Aug 2026; no restart date is published.^1,13
Madhya Bhotekoshi, 102 MW. Sindhupalchok, on a different river. Commercial operation 6 Oct 2025; revenue Rs 214.47 crore and profit Rs 16.96 crore to 16 Jul 2026; debt Rs 1,587 crore. Chilime’s cost Rs 222 crore.^20,1
Sanjen, 57.3 MW. Upper Sanjen 14.8 MW and Sanjen 42.5 MW. Revenue Rs 164.16 crore, profit Rs 8.20 crore, debt Rs 942 crore. The plants are intact but the Chilime hub that carries their power was swept away.^19,23,26
Rasuwagadhi, 111 MW. Revenue Rs 126.67 crore and a loss of Rs 144.59 crore to 16 Jul 2026, before the flood; debt Rs 1,782 crore. Destroyed a second time on 26 Aug 2026.^18,15
Chilime-Seti, 87 MW. Seti Nadi-3 in Bajhang: estimated cost Rs 1,944 crore, land acquired, grid connection agreed, no power purchase agreement and so no financing. Chilime has put in about Rs 60.5 crore.^1,8
Chilime Engineering and Services. Engineering consultancy since 2016/17; Chilime invested Rs 8.93 crore and received a Rs 3 crore dividend in the year to mid-July 2025. Plans a public issue.^1,8
Dividends to shareholders. Rs 185.1 crore of cash declared for the five years to mid-July 2025, 54.4% of standalone profit, plus Rs 320.4 crore of bonus shares.^1,2,3,4,5
Loans to the project companies. Rs 160.9 crore at mid-July 2025: Sanjen Rs 67.9 crore, Madhya Bhotekoshi Rs 58.0 crore, Rasuwagadhi Rs 35.0 crore, at interest.¹
Guarantees to the EPF. Rs 4,134 crore of the project companies’ EPF loans (principal and capitalised interest) and Rs 132.7 crore to Himalayan Bank for Sanjen.¹

Company	MW	Chilime’s share	Status, Oct 2026	Revenue, year to Jul 2026	Profit	Debt	Chilime’s cost
Chilime plant	22.1	100%	Down since 26 Aug 2026	Rs 116.76 cr	Rs 72.01 cr (company)	none	n/a
Madhya Bhotekoshi (MBJC)	102	37.00% (voting 57.14% earlier)	Running since 6 Oct 2025	Rs 214.47 cr (part year)	Rs 16.96 cr	Rs 1,587 cr	Rs 222.0 cr
Sanjen (SJCL)	57.3	39.36% (voting 66.66% earlier)	Intact; output stranded	Rs 164.16 cr	Rs 8.20 cr	Rs 942 cr	Rs 143.7 cr
Rasuwagadhi (RHPL)	111	32.79% (voting 50%)	Destroyed 26 Aug 2026	Rs 126.67 cr	Rs -144.59 cr	Rs 1,782 cr	Rs 224.4 cr
Chilime-Seti (Seti Nadi-3)	87	74.42% of paid capital (41% planned)	No power purchase agreement	none	n/a	none	about Rs 60.5 cr
Chilime Engineering and Services	n/a	100%	Operating	Rs 9.73 cr (2025)	n/a	none	Rs 8.9 cr
Licences: Budhi Gandaki Prok, Chumchet Syarkhola	81 and 45	Chilime	Licensed; no access road or power purchase agreement	none	n/a	none	Rs 31.2 cr in work in progress

Investee figures from their unaudited fourth-quarter statements to 16 Jul 2026; shares and cost from Chilime’s note 5.1.1. “Voting” is as printed in note 5.1.1 for the years when Chilime treated them as subsidiaries. Budhi Gandaki Prok is 81 MW in the licence notice and 61 MW in the fourth-quarter report.^1,8,20,19,18

Capacity, MW	Whole projects	Chilime’s look-through share
Running normally (Madhya Bhotekoshi)	102.0	37.7
Intact but stranded (Sanjen)	57.3	22.6
Down, under debris (Chilime)	22.1	22.1
Destroyed (Rasuwagadhi)	111.0	36.4
Before the flood, all operating	292.4	118.8
Licensed or in development (Seti Nadi-3, Budhi Gandaki Prok, Chumchet Syarkhola)	213	not yet owned in final proportions

The “about 270 MW” often quoted for the portfolio is the four project companies’ 270.3 MW (Sanjen 57.3, Madhya Bhotekoshi 102, Rasuwagadhi 111), without Chilime’s own 22.1 MW. Look-through = MW x Chilime’s shareholding; our arithmetic.^1,23

In the year to mid-July 2025 Sanjen and Rasuwagadhi stopped being subsidiaries. Chilime’s shareholding did not change; the composition of their boards did, and with it control. Their assets and Rs 2,464 crore of group borrowings left the consolidated balance sheet, and they are now carried by the equity method.¹ The guarantees did not change.

What do the accounts show for the money that went in?

07. A steady profit, a shrinking cash pile, and a group that earns half

Standalone net profit, years to mid-July, Rs crore

Jul 21: Rs 66.15 crore
Jul 22: Rs 74.67 crore
Jul 23: Rs 64.28 crore
Jul 24: Rs 67.85 crore
Jul 25: Rs 67.65 crore
Jul 26: Rs 72.01 crore (provisional, unaudited)

The company alone, as printed in the five-year table; the last year is unaudited. Profit has stayed between Rs 64 crore and Rs 75 crore because the tariff is fixed and the plant runs reliably. Axis starts at zero.

Electricity sold to NEA, years to mid-July, GWh

Jul 19: Rs 153.75 crore
Jul 20: Rs 146.35 crore
Jul 21: Rs 148.05 crore
Jul 22: Rs 156.07 crore
Jul 23: Rs 149.00 crore
Jul 24: Rs 141.31 crore
Jul 25: Rs 146.80 crore

Regular plus excess energy as billed. The contract’s deemed energy is 132.9 GWh; the theoretical maximum at 22.1 MW all year is 193.6 GWh, so the plant ran at a 73% to 81% capacity factor.

Cash and term deposits, mid-July, Rs crore

Jul 21: Rs 222.27 crore
Jul 22: Rs 223.65 crore
Jul 23: Rs 136.75 crore
Jul 24: Rs 157.75 crore
Jul 25: Rs 51.77 crore
Jul 26: Rs 36.74 crore (provisional, unaudited)

Standalone. The fall matches the loans to the project companies (other current assets rose from Rs 15 crore to Rs 216 crore over the same years) and Rs 57.6 crore of capital spending in the year to mid-July 2025, mostly the Rs 53.3 crore office tower.

Other current assets (mostly loans to the project companies), mid-July, Rs crore

Jul 21: Rs 15.34 crore
Jul 22: Rs 26.64 crore
Jul 23: Rs 81.77 crore
Jul 24: Rs 60.22 crore
Jul 25: Rs 178.13 crore
Jul 26: Rs 216.20 crore (provisional, unaudited)

At mid-July 2025, Rs 163.5 crore of the Rs 178.1 crore was owed by Sanjen, Madhya Bhotekoshi and Rasuwagadhi (note 5.1.3). The 2026 split is not published.

Standalone, Rs crore	Jul 2021	Jul 2022	Jul 2023	Jul 2024	Jul 2025	Jul 2026*
Revenue (electricity)	112.81	118.17	112.86	111.59	112.57	116.76
Operating profit	73.94	77.31	67.82	68.53	70.64	75.06
Finance income	16.25	19.54	24.73	16.09	13.47	13.59
Net profit	66.15	74.67	64.28	67.85	67.65	72.01
Cash from operations (company’s own line)	64.73	50.02	39.04	94.70	-78.93	n/a
Cash dividends paid in the year	57.10	47.11	50.64	36.29	15.97	n/a
Cash and term deposits	222.27	223.65	136.75	157.75	51.77	36.74
Other current assets	15.34	26.64	81.77	60.22	178.13	216.20
Equity	1,010.48	1,037.87	1,051.02	1,094.87	1,146.75	1,175.22
Return on equity, %	6.5	7.3	6.2	6.3	6.0	6.2
Finance income as % of pre-tax profit	18.3	20.0	26.6	18.9	15.3	14.9
EPS as printed, Rs	10.53	11.17	8.86	8.50	7.70	7.59
EPS on today’s shares, Rs	6.97	7.87	6.78	7.15	7.13	7.59

*Unaudited fourth-quarter statement; cash-flow lines not published for it. Cash from operations is the company’s own line: interest received is shown under investing and tax paid under financing, and the 2025 figure is negative because loans to the project companies are counted as operating assets. Return on equity on average equity, our arithmetic.^1,2,3,4,5,8

Profit is steady because the plant is. About 15% to 27% of pre-tax profit is interest income, on bank deposits and, increasingly, on loans to the project companies.^1,8 Return on equity stayed between 6% and 7.3%, because equity includes Rs 590 crore of investments that earn nothing in the standalone accounts.

Cash tells a different story from profit. Cash and term deposits fell from Rs 222 crore in 2021 to Rs 37 crore in 2026 while other current assets, mostly loans to Sanjen, Madhya Bhotekoshi and Rasuwagadhi, rose from Rs 15 crore to Rs 216 crore. In the year to mid-July 2025 the company’s own cash-flow line was negative (Rs -78.9 crore) because those loans are treated as operating assets.^1,8

Year to mid-July 2025, Rs crore	Chilime alone	Group
Revenue	112.57	122.30 (with consultancy)
Share of the project companies’ results	not included	-27.95
of which Rasuwagadhi		-15.43
of which Sanjen		-10.98
of which Madhya Bhotekoshi		-1.54
Profit for shareholders	67.65	35.90
Earnings per share, Rs	7.70	4.09
Investments in the project companies	590.04 at cost	520.93 equity-accounted

Audited statements. The group figure uses the project companies’ management accounts for Rasuwagadhi, which is why the opinion was qualified.¹

Profit year	Cash	Bonus	Cash, Rs crore	Bonus, Rs crore	Net profit, Rs crore	Cash as % of profit
2077/78	7.5%	7.5%	47.11	47.11	66.15	71.2
2078/79	7.5%	7.5%	50.64	50.64	74.67	67.8
2079/80	5%	10%	36.29	72.58	64.28	56.5
2080/81	2%	10%	15.97	79.84	67.85	23.5
2081/82	4%	8%	35.13	70.26	67.65	51.9

As proposed in each annual meeting notice (percentages of paid-up capital, tax included). Five years: Rs 185.1 crore of cash, 54.4% of profit, and Rs 320.4 crore of bonus shares. Each year’s paid-up capital equals the previous one plus the bonus, and each year’s cash paid equals the cash declared a year earlier: both checked.^1,2,3,4,5

Why this matters. The P/E on most data sites divides the price by the standalone EPS, which excludes the project companies’ losses. The group EPS for the year to mid-July 2025 was Rs 4.09, not Rs 7.70.

So did the strategy create value for shareholders?

08. What went in, what came back, and what was promised

Item	Rs crore	Basis
Shares in the five companies, at cost (mid-July 2025)	657.15	Note 5.1.1
Loans to Sanjen, Madhya Bhotekoshi and Rasuwagadhi	160.87	Note 20.2
Interest received on those loans, year to Jul 2025	6.65	Note 20.2
Dividends received from investees, year to Jul 2025	3.00	ChesCo only; none was received in the year to Jul 2026
Accumulated losses of the three hydropower companies, Jul 2026	Rasuwagadhi 225.7; Madhya Bhotekoshi 22.5; Sanjen about 59.3	Their statements; none can pay a dividend until these are cleared
Market value of the three listed stakes, 16 Oct 2026	1,441.74	Prices x shares held

An internal rate of return cannot be computed reliably: the dated contributions over 2011 to 2024 are not published year by year in the reports we read. On the evidence available, the cash returned so far is interest on the loans and one Rs 3 crore dividend.^{1,8,18,19,20,30}

EPF loan guaranteed by Chilime, mid-July 2025	Approved	Drawn	Interest capitalised	Outstanding (as printed)
Sanjen	Rs 567.2 cr	Rs 508.4 cr	Rs 432.8 cr	Rs 910.2 cr
Madhya Bhotekoshi	Rs 888.9 cr	Rs 888.9 cr	Rs 688.9 cr	Rs 1,577.7 cr
Rasuwagadhi	Rs 1,016.7 cr	Rs 1,016.2 cr	Rs 629.9 cr	Rs 1,646.1 cr
Total	Rs 2,472.7 cr	Rs 2,413.5 cr	Rs 1,751.5 cr	Rs 4,134.0 cr
Plus: Himalayan Bank letter of credit for Sanjen				Rs 132.7 cr (USD 9.64 million)
Chilime’s own equity, same date				Rs 1,146.8 cr

Note 25 of the 2025 accounts. The printed total deducts Sanjen’s Rs 31.0 crore repayment but not Rasuwagadhi’s Rs 31.2 crore; net of both it would be Rs 4,102.8 crore. Rasuwagadhi’s own accounts show its EPF loan at Rs 1,478.3 crore (non-current) on the same date. Note 25 also says property at the project sites is mortgaged as security for the guarantees. The guarantee terms (on demand or after enforcement, cap, release) are not published.^1,17

The guarantee for Rasuwagadhi alone (Rs 1,646 crore) is 1.44 times Chilime’s equity and about Rs 174 for every Chilime share in issue, against a share price of Rs 336.70. We do not know the terms: whether the EPF can call on Chilime directly, or only after enforcing against Rasuwagadhi’s assets, and whether the amount is capped. Lender and guarantor are both state-linked, and the EPF has so far cut its rate rather than enforce.^1,20,31

Our reading: the strategy multiplied Chilime’s exposure to hydropower in one river corridor, financed mostly with the EPF’s money and Chilime’s promise. It has not yet returned cash. Whether it creates value depends on Madhya Bhotekoshi and Sanjen paying down their debt, and on how the Rasuwagadhi guarantee is handled.

Then came the floods. What exactly did they do?

09. July 2025 and August 2026

The first flood, on the night of 24 Asadh 2082 (8 Jul 2025), sent water into Chilime’s tailrace and machine hall. The plant was down nine days, about Rs 0.89 crore of equipment was damaged and about Rs 2.8 crore of sales were lost. Rasuwagadhi stopped for nearly a year and lodged a Rs 175 crore insurance claim.^1,17,31

The second, on 26 Aug 2026, was far worse. The access to Chilime’s underground powerhouse was blocked by debris; floodwater and mud filled the project; generation stopped. A joint team led by the Nepali Army reached the powerhouse through a narrow opening and recovered five bodies on 16 Sep; one employee is still missing.^12,13,22

Effect of the 26 Aug 2026 flood	What the record shows	Status
Chilime plant	Powerhouse access blocked by debris; floodwater and mud inside; generation halted	Established (company, press)
People	Six on duty missing; five bodies recovered on 16 Sep; one still missing	Established (company)
Repair cost	Not published	Unknown
Insurance	Plant premium Rs 26.3 lakh in the year to Jul 2025; sum insured and loss-of-revenue cover not disclosed; no claim figure published	Unknown
Lost revenue	About Rs 9.73 crore a month at last year’s run rate (our arithmetic)	Our calculation
Sanjen	Plants intact; output cannot reach the grid because the Chilime hub was swept away; NEA preparing to run it for local supply	Reported
Rasuwagadhi	Most structures damaged beyond recognition; 52 staff and 39 contractors’ workers missing; access road and six bridges destroyed	Established (company)
Madhya Bhotekoshi	Not on any damage list we found	Reported (absence)
The guarantees	Unchanged on paper; Rasuwagadhi now has no revenue to service its EPF loan	Our reading

The first two flood effects on Chilime (July 2025) are documented in the 2025 annual report; the August 2026 figures come from company notices to 16 Oct 2026 and the press. Searched in English and Nepali to 20 Oct 2026 for a Chilime repair estimate, claim or restart date: none found.^{12,13,14,15,23,26,22,1}

What is not established. No repair estimate, restart date, sum insured or insurance claim for Chilime’s plant had been published by 20 Oct 2026. A former energy minister estimated two to three years for the corridor if rebuilt “on a war footing”; that is an opinion. We give no damage figure we could not source.

Who decides how Chilime responds?

10. NEA’s company, with two empty independent seats

The articles provide for eleven directors: five from NEA, four elected by the public (one a woman) and two independent. Both independent seats are vacant. The four public directors have sat since June 2015.¹

Director	Represents	From	To
Hitendra Dev Shakya (chair)	NEA	2082/09/04	continuing
Manoj Silwal (chair)	NEA	2082/06/12	2082/09/03
Hitendra Dev Shakya (chair)	NEA	2082/01/02	2082/06/11
Kulman Ghising (chair)	NEA	2078/05/05	2081/12/09
Dirghayu Kumar Shrestha	NEA	2081/03/20	continuing
Fanendra Raj Joshi	NEA	2082/01/02	continuing
Subhash Kumar Mishra	NEA	2079/09/14	continuing
Samir Prasad Pokharel	NEA	2082/01/02	continuing
Tulasi Ram Dhakal	Public	2072/02/30	continuing (third term)
Ram Prasad Rimal	Public	2072/02/30	continuing (third term)
Bhim Prasad Timalsina	Public	2072/02/30	continuing (third term)
Shanti Laxmi Shakya	Public (woman director)	2072/02/30	continuing (third term)
Two independent directors			vacant

Directors’ report, 29th annual report (Bikram Sambat dates as printed; 2082/09/04 is 19 Dec 2025, 2072/02/30 is 13 Jun 2015). Chief executive: Baburaja Maharjan; company secretary: Narayan Prasad Acharya. Total meeting and other allowances, year to Jul 2025: Rs 22.03 lakh.¹

Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) (Controlling shareholder (51%), sole buyer of the power, five of eleven board seats). NEA founded Chilime, guaranteed its first loans in 2003/04 and buys every unit at the tariff in the 1997 agreement. It also holds 18% of Rasuwagadhi, about 10% of Sanjen and Madhya Bhotekoshi, and 10% of Chilime-Seti. NEA is customer, controller and co-investor at once. The related-party note records every sale to it; the tariff has not moved in the years we read. For a minority shareholder NEA’s interests and the public’s usually point the same way, but not always: a fixed tariff, the choice of projects and how the guarantees are handled are all decided with NEA at the table.
Kulman Ghising (Chair, Aug 2021 to Mar 2025 (as NEA managing director); later energy minister). Chaired the board from 2078/05/05 to 2081/12/09 while running NEA, the years in which Upper Sanjen, Sanjen and Rasuwagadhi were completed. After the 2026 flood, as a former energy minister, he estimated recovery in the corridor at two to three years “on a war footing”. His estimate is the only public timetable we found for the area; it is an opinion, not a plan.
Hitendra Dev Shakya (Chair since Dec 2025 (NEA representative); chair Apr to Sep 2025). Chair from 2082/01/02 to 2082/06/11, replaced by Manoj Silwal, and chair again from 2082/09/04. In the year to mid-July 2004 he was the plant’s chief. He leads the board that must decide on rebuilding the plant he once ran, and on the company’s response to the guarantees. Three changes of chair in nine months, all NEA representatives. The reports do not say why.
The public directors and the auditors (Four directors elected by the public, third term since June 2015; K.M.U & Associates (FY 2081/82)). Tulasi Ram Dhakal, Ram Prasad Rimal, Bhim Prasad Timalsina and Shanti Laxmi Shakya have sat since 2072/02/30. The two independent seats are vacant. The auditors qualified the group opinion for the year to mid-July 2025 because Rasuwagadhi’s accounts were unaudited. The directors’ report says the project companies deliver audited accounts late, which delays Chilime’s own audit and meeting. Late investee audits produced qualified or modified group opinions in three of the last four years.

The auditors qualified the group opinion for the years to mid-July 2022, 2023 and 2025, each time because of an investee: contractor advances at Rasuwagadhi, consolidation from unaudited accounts, and Rasuwagadhi’s unaudited figures. The standalone accounts were not qualified.^4,3,1

What does the legal record show?

11. The legal record: seven matters, no court finding against the company

We registered every legal, regulatory or audit matter touching Chilime that we found in its reports and in English and Nepali news to 20 Oct 2026, with its exact status. We searched for any case by the anti-corruption commission or any court finding against the company and found none.

7 matters, newest checked 20 October 2026.

L1 Qualified audit opinions on the group accounts (2022, 2023, 2025). Status: Opinions issued; the standalone accounts are not qualified. Role: Reporting entity. Forum: Statutory audit. Allegation: 2022: Rasuwagadhi paid contractor advances without bank guarantees (from Rasuwagadhi’s own audit). 2023: subsidiaries consolidated from unaudited statements. 2025: the auditors could not verify Rasuwagadhi’s carrying amount and loss because its audit was not finished. Response: The directors’ report says the project companies deliver audited accounts late and that this delays Chilime’s audit and meeting. Latest: Concluded for each year; the pattern is the point. Imposed: none; claimed: n/a; recognised in the accounts: n/a. Sources: ^1,3,4 Last checked 2026-10-20.
L2 Income-tax reassessments: is non-electricity income exempt?. Status: Review application with the Inland Revenue Department; reassessments for three years outstanding. Role: Taxpayer. Forum: Inland Revenue Department; Revenue Tribunal (earlier appeal). Allegation: The tax office says the hydropower exemption covered only electricity income, not interest and other income. Chilime had treated all income as exempt for 15 years. Response: Chilime appealed (2024) and later filed a review application; reassessments for FY 2077/78 to 2079/80 were not yet done. Latest: Pending. Imposed: not stated; claimed: Rs 28.77 crore (2024 contingent table); recognised in the accounts: Deposits with the tax office sit inside Rs 31.1 crore of other deposits. Sources: ^1,8 Last checked 2026-10-20.
L3 The Chilime Tower contract: delay penalties and time extensions. Status: Arbitrator appointed; no award found. Role: Employer under the contract. Forum: Arbitration. Allegation: The parties disagree over time extensions and penalties for delay in building the office tower. Response: Chilime says it is seeking a solution through an arbitrator. Latest: Pending. Imposed: none; claimed: not stated; recognised in the accounts: Rs 13.13 crore advanced to the contractor sits in advances (mid-July 2025). Sources: ^9,1 Last checked 2026-10-20.
L4 Neighbours’ writ against the tower’s building permit. Status: Sub judice in the Supreme Court. Role: Respondent. Forum: Supreme Court. Allegation: Neighbours to the north and east asked the court to halt approval of the tower’s map. Response: Not stated beyond the disclosure. Latest: Pending. Imposed: none; claimed: not stated; recognised in the accounts: none. Sources: ⁸ Last checked 2026-10-20.
L5 Auditor’s other matters: land freeze and VAT registration. Status: Raised by the auditors in 2025; no outcome found. Role: Reporting entity. Forum: None yet. Allegation: A notice through the Rasuwa district office froze land sales for a road to a headworks site, covering land well away from the works; the landowner’s appeals were not acted on. Separately, staff and vehicles charged to subsidiaries were netted off costs and no VAT was charged, without VAT registration. Response: Not stated in the report. Latest: Unresolved. Imposed: none; claimed: not stated; recognised in the accounts: none. Sources: ¹ Last checked 2026-10-20.
L6 Rasuwagadhi and its former transmission-line contractor. Status: Lawsuit reported in Rasuwagadhi’s accounts; outcome not found. Role: Shareholder of the defendant (32.79%) and guarantor of its EPF loan. Forum: Court (not named in the note we read). Allegation: The contractor sued after Rasuwagadhi ended the contract; a new contractor finished the line. Response: Rasuwagadhi disclosed it as a contingent liability. Latest: Outcome not found by 20 Oct 2026. Imposed: none; claimed: not stated in what we read; recognised in the accounts: Contingent in Rasuwagadhi’s accounts. Sources: ^2,4 Last checked 2026-10-20.
L7 Deaths of six people on duty in the 2026 flood. Status: No investigation, charge or compensation claim against the company found. Role: Employer. Forum: None found. Allegation: None against the company in the records we read. One newspaper commentary argued that the flood risk to the tunnel was in the design; that is opinion. Response: The company describes the search, says five bodies were found and one employee is missing, and grants Rs 5 lakh to each family. Latest: No proceeding found by 20 Oct 2026. Imposed: none; claimed: none; recognised in the accounts: Relief of Rs 25 lakh in all (our arithmetic). Sources: ^13,14,27 Last checked 2026-10-20.

Why this matters. None of these matters is large next to the guarantees. The tax review and the tower arbitration are a few rupees a share each. The audit qualifications matter because they show how much of the group picture rests on investees’ unaudited figures.

What could go wrong from here?

12. What could go wrong, ranked, and what to watch

The EPF guarantees: HIGH. Chilime guaranteed Rs 4,134 crore of EPF loans (mid-July 2025), Rs 1,646 crore of it for Rasuwagadhi, whose plant was destroyed in August 2026. That one guarantee is 1.44 times Chilime’s equity. The terms are not published. What would change our view: A statement from the EPF or Chilime on how the guarantee would work, or a Rasuwagadhi restructuring that leaves the EPF whole.
Repair, restart and insurance: HIGH. The plant has been down since 26 Aug 2026 and earns about Rs 9.73 crore a month when running. No damage estimate, sum insured or claim has been published; the premium was Rs 26.3 lakh in the year to mid-July 2025. What would change our view: A published repair cost, an insurer’s advance, and NEA restoring the Chilime hub and the 66 kV line.
The corridor itself: HIGH. Two destructive floods on the Bhotekoshi in 14 months. Chilime, Sanjen and Rasuwagadhi all sit in it and share the same evacuation route. What would change our view: Early-warning systems on the glacial lakes and a rebuilt transmission route away from the riverbed.
Cash going to the project companies: MEDIUM. Term deposits and cash fell from Rs 222 crore (2021) to Rs 37 crore (2026). Loans to Sanjen, Madhya Bhotekoshi and Rasuwagadhi reached Rs 161 crore in 2025. What would change our view: Repayment of the loans as the running plants generate cash, or dividends from them.
Governance and disclosure: MEDIUM. NEA appoints the chair and five directors; both independent seats are vacant; the group opinion was qualified for 2022, 2023 and 2025; the guarantees sit outside the contingent-liability table. What would change our view: Independent directors appointed; audited investee accounts on time; the guarantee terms disclosed.
A fixed tariff from the controlling shareholder: MEDIUM. Every unit is sold to NEA at a rate that has not changed in the years we read, while costs rise about 3% a year. What would change our view: Any renegotiation of the 1997 agreement, or export sales at higher prices.
Tax, contractor and neighbour disputes: LOW. A review of tax reassessments with the Inland Revenue Department, an arbitration over the office tower contract (Rs 13.1 crore advanced), and a neighbours’ writ in the Supreme Court over the tower. What would change our view: Decisions in any of them.

In 2003/04 NEA stood guarantee for Chilime’s loans. By 2025 Chilime stood guarantee for Rs 4,134 crore of its project companies’ loans. Why it matters: The model was passed down one level. The guaranteed sum is 3.6 times Chilime’s own equity, and the guarantee is for loans to companies Chilime does not control.
The contingent-liability table for 2025 shows nil. Why it matters: Note 23.1 lists contingent liabilities of zero at mid-July 2025 (Rs 28.85 crore of tax and labour cases the year before). Note 25, two pages later, lists the EPF guarantees. Both are in the same audited accounts.
Chilime has been paid Rs 8.17 a unit in every year we read. Why it matters: Regular energy at Rs 8.17 and excess at Rs 4.08, the years to mid-July 2019 to 2025. Plant costs rose about 3% a year over the same period, so the plant earns slightly less in real terms each year.
In the year to mid-July 2025 the group earned about half what the company did. Why it matters: Standalone profit Rs 67.65 crore; group profit for shareholders Rs 35.90 crore, after Rs 27.95 crore of losses from the three project companies. The EPS on most data sites is the standalone one.
The chair today ran the plant when it opened. Why it matters: The year-to-July 2004 report lists Hitendra Dev Shakya as plant chief. He chairs the board that must decide how to rebuild it.
One printed figure drops a digit. Why it matters: The 2025 revenue note prints regular energy as 12,870,514 units; the revenue and the total imply 128,790,514. We use the corrected figure and log it.

Ask which profit the P/E divides. The standalone EPS (Rs 7.59) leaves out the project companies’ losses. The group EPS for the year to mid-July 2025 was Rs 4.09 against Rs 7.70 standalone.^1,8
Read the guarantee note, not only the contingent-liability table. The table can say nil while another note lists guarantees larger than the company.¹
Installed megawatts are not generation, and generation is not cash. Of 292.4 MW in the portfolio before the flood, 102 MW runs normally today; Sanjen’s 57.3 MW works but cannot reach the grid.^23,20
A project’s capacity is not the parent’s. Chilime’s look-through share of the four running projects is about 119 MW, including its own 22.1 MW, not 292 MW. Its guarantees, though, cover the whole of each EPF loan.¹

If you were a shareholder, what would you ask?

13. Seven questions an investor should ask

Answered as far as the sources allow.

Is Chilime still a power company, or an investment company?

Both, and the balance has shifted. Before the flood the plant made all of the operating profit; by value, the three listed stakes alone are worth Rs 1,442 crore at market, 45% of Chilime’s market value on 16 Oct 2026.^30,1 With the plant down, the portfolio is most of what is left.

How much of the portfolio actually generates power today?

Of 292.4 MW in the four plants before the flood, Madhya Bhotekoshi’s 102 MW runs normally. Sanjen’s 57.3 MW is intact but its power cannot reach the grid; Chilime’s 22.1 MW is under debris; Rasuwagadhi’s 111 MW is destroyed. Chilime’s look-through share of what runs is about 38 MW.^{23,26,20,13,15}

Has the investment strategy paid shareholders?

Not yet in cash. Rs 657 crore went into shares and Rs 161 crore into loans; the three hydropower companies all show accumulated losses at mid-July 2026, so none can pay a dividend. The return so far is the interest on the loans (Rs 6.65 crore in the year to July 2025) and a Rs 3 crore dividend from the engineering company. At market prices the listed stakes are worth more than they cost, but those prices are set on small floats.^{1,18,19,20,30}

What is the guarantee, and could it really cost Chilime money?

Chilime promised the EPF to stand behind the loans of Sanjen, Madhya Bhotekoshi and Rasuwagadhi. At mid-July 2025 the guaranteed balances were Rs 4,134 crore, Rs 1,646 crore of it Rasuwagadhi’s.¹ Rasuwagadhi now has no revenue. Whether the EPF would ever call on Chilime depends on terms that are not published and on how two state-linked bodies choose to act. It is the largest uncertainty in this file.

Why is the group profit so much lower than the EPS on data sites?

Data sites quote the standalone EPS (Rs 7.59 for the year to July 2026). The group accounts include the project companies’ losses: Rs 27.95 crore in the year to July 2025, which took group EPS to Rs 4.09 against Rs 7.70 standalone.^1,8

Can the dividend continue?

The plant that earned the profit is not running. Cash and term deposits were Rs 36.7 crore at mid-July 2026, down from Rs 222 crore in 2021, with about Rs 216 crore in other current assets, mostly loans to the project companies. A cash dividend now depends on those loans being repaid and on insurance, not on this year’s profit.^8,1

What would you ask the company?

Five things: the terms of the EPF guarantees; the plant’s sum insured, whether it carries loss-of-revenue cover, and the claim filed; the repair estimate and restart date; how much of the Rs 216 crore of other current assets is owed by Rasuwagadhi; and why the contingent-liability table shows nil while note 25 lists the guarantees.

What does the evidence, taken together, support?

14. What is known, what is not, and what would change our mind

Reading	For	Against	Where it stands
A steady utility that pays dividends	Two decades of 73% to 81% capacity factor; profit Rs 64 crore to 75 crore a year; cash dividends every year	The plant is down; the tariff is flat; the dividend capacity now depends on cash, not profit	True until August 2026; not now
A holding company whose value is in the portfolio	Listed stakes worth Rs 1,442 crore at market, 45% of Chilime’s value	The project companies carry Rs 4,311 crore of debt, have accumulated losses and pay no dividends	The best description of what Chilime has become
A company carrying an unpriced liability	Guarantees of Rs 4,134 crore; Rasuwagadhi destroyed	The EPF has rescheduled rather than enforced; both lender and guarantor are state-linked	Plausible; unquantifiable from the filings
A flood casualty the market has over-punished	Price down 29.1%	Our sum of the parts (Rs 119) is far below the price even before the flood	Not supported by our valuation

Set out before the numbers were assembled; the last column is our assessment. See the valuation for the arithmetic.³²

Our view. Chilime is no longer the steady one-plant utility its history suggests. It is a holding company whose own plant is down, whose one running investee is Madhya Bhotekoshi, and whose largest commitment is a set of guarantees the balance sheet does not show. Nothing here is a finding of wrongdoing. Our valuation puts the parts at about Rs 112 a share, weighted, against Rs 336.70.³²

What would change our mind. (1) Published guarantee terms that limit Chilime’s exposure. (2) A repair estimate and insurance cover that make a 2027 restart likely. (3) Repayment of the loans to the project companies. (4) A first dividend from Madhya Bhotekoshi or Sanjen.

What we could not establish	Why it matters	Next step
The guarantee terms	Whether the EPF can call on Chilime before enforcing against the project assets decides the risk	Ask the company; read the tripartite agreements if published
Sum insured and cover	Insurance decides how much of the repair Chilime pays	The next annual report; insurer disclosures
Repair estimate and restart date	Each month offline costs about Rs 9.7 crore of revenue	Company notices; first-quarter report
Licence expiry dates of the project companies	Sets how long their cash flows run	Department of Electricity Development records
The split of Rs 216 crore of other current assets (2026)	How much is owed by Rasuwagadhi	Audited accounts to Jul 2026
Holders above 1% and their beneficial owners	Who besides NEA can influence votes	A shareholder register; none published
Exact registration date and early financing terms	History only	Company Registrar

Searched in English and Nepali to 20 Oct 2026.

How do we know the numbers are right, and where do sources disagree?

15. How we checked, and where sources differ

Primary documents carry the numbers: the annual reports for the years to mid-July 2004, 2019, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025, the quarterly reports for 2025/26, the company’s flood notices, and the investees’ own reports. Nepali text and scanned pages were read in the original. Totals, ratios and the guarantee table were recomputed from the sources; dividends and bonus shares were checked against the change in paid-up capital each year. Press reports are labelled and used only where filings are silent.

Claim	Figure	Period	Sources	Status	Note
Guaranteed EPF loans outstanding	Rs 4,134.0 crore (3.6x equity)	16 Jul 2025	¹	Verified	Note 25; rows recomputed. Printed total deducts only Sanjen’s repayment.
Contingent liabilities	Nil	16 Jul 2025	¹	Verified	Note 23.1 table; Rs 28.85 crore the year before.
Standalone net profit	Rs 67.65 crore (2025, audited); Rs 72.01 crore (2026, unaudited)	Years to mid-July	^1,8,25	Verified	Statement lines foot in our checks.
Group profit for shareholders	Rs 35.90 crore	Year to mid-July 2025	¹	Verified	Qualified opinion: Rasuwagadhi on management accounts.
Unaudited-to-audited revision, year to Jul 2025	Profit Rs 68.56 crore unaudited, Rs 67.65 crore audited (-1.3%)	Year to mid-July 2025	^10,1	Verified	Comparative column of the first-quarter 2025/26 report against the annual report.
Investment at cost	Rs 657.15 crore	16 Jul 2025	¹	Verified	Note 5.1.1; ties to the balance sheet.
Loans to the project companies	Rs 160.87 crore (note 20.2); Rs 163.5 crore with interest (note 5.1.3)	16 Jul 2025	¹	Verified	Two notes, two definitions.
Energy sold	146.8 GWh; capacity factor 75.8%	Year to mid-July 2025	¹	Partially verified	Regular units misprinted; total and revenue agree.
Tariff	Rs 8.17 regular, Rs 4.08 excess	Years to mid-July 2019 to 2025	^1,6	Verified	Revenue notes of each year.
Licence term	10 Aug 1997 to mid-July 2047		^5,6	Verified	Note 1.1.3.
Original project cost	Rs 247.79 crore against a Rs 232.32 crore estimate; 22 months late	2003/04	⁷	Verified	Read from the page image.
Plant status after 26 Aug 2026	Powerhouse access blocked; generation halted	To 18 Oct 2026	^12,13,22	Verified	Company notices and the press agree.
People lost at Chilime	Six missing; five bodies found; one missing	17 Sep 2026	^13,24	Verified	Company statement.
Sanjen output stranded	Hub swept away; isolated-mode operation prepared	Sep 2026	^23,26	Partially verified	Press and a ministry briefing; no Sanjen notice read.
Madhya Bhotekoshi undamaged	Not on any damage list found	Sep to Oct 2026	²³	Partially verified	An absence; searched English and Nepali.
Market value of listed stakes	Rs 1,441.7 crore	16 Oct 2026	^30,1	Verified	Shares held x closes.
First hydropower company listed on NEPSE	As reported	2009	²⁸	Unverified	A newspaper statement; no exchange record read.
Plant sum insured	Not disclosed		¹	Not available	Only the premium (Rs 26.3 lakh) is shown.
Guarantee terms	Not disclosed		¹	Not available	Note 25 gives amounts only.

Item	Source A	Source B	How we treat it
Rasuwagadhi’s carrying amount in the 2025 group accounts	Auditor’s report: Rs 23,691,268,414	Group note 5.1.1: Rs 1,964,311,721	The note ties to the balance sheet; the auditor’s figure looks like a different number (Rasuwagadhi’s own assets are of that order). Logged, not used.
Sanjen 42.5 MW commercial operation	Project table: 2081/09/01	Directors’ text: 2082/09/01	We use 2081/09/01 (16 Dec 2024); Sanjen’s full-year revenue to Jul 2026 supports it.
Madhya Bhotekoshi commercial operation	Its own Q4 report: 2082 Asoj 20 (6 Oct 2025)	Chilime: 2082/07/16 (table), 2082/07/20 (text)	We use the company’s own date.
Date of the July 2025 flood	Chilime operations report: night of 24 Asadh 2082	Directors’ report on Rasuwagadhi: from 2082/03/19	Both in one report; 24 Asadh is 8 Jul 2025, the widely reported date.
Guarantee outstanding	Printed total Rs 4,134.0 crore	Rows net of both repayments: Rs 4,102.8 crore	We quote the printed figure and state the difference.
Himalayan Bank guarantee	Note 20: Rs 132.67 crore	Note 25: Rs 1,132.67 crore	USD 9,641,488.8 x 137.60 = Rs 132.67 crore; note 25 has an extra digit.
Regular energy, year to Jul 2025	Printed 12,870,514 units	Implied 128,790,514	Revenue and total units imply the larger figure.
EPS, year to Jul 2022	Printed Rs 11.17	Profit / year-end shares: Rs 11.06	Likely a weighted share count; not used.
Sanjen and Rasuwagadhi in the quarterlies	Q3 2026: “investment in subsidiary” Rs 437.5 crore	Audited 2025: associates	The quarterlies kept the old labels; the fourth quarter reclassified.
Other current assets at 13 Apr 2026	Q3 report: Rs 12.1 crore, term deposits Rs 214.4 crore	Q4 report’s comparative: Rs 204.1 crore, term deposits Rs 22.5 crore	Reclassified between the two; we use year-end figures only.
Chilime-Seti paid-up capital	Directors’ report: Rs 58 crore paid up, of which NEA Rs 19.99 crore	Note 5.1.1: Chilime alone Rs 58.18 crore	Unreconciled; NEA’s payment may be share money not yet issued.
Budhi Gandaki Prok capacity	Licence and annual report: 81 MW	Q4 report: 61 MW	Unreconciled.
Five-year table header	Third column labelled 2081.03.31	It is the year to 2080.03.31	A typing error; the figures match the 2023 report.

Every disagreement we found between documents, with what we used. None changes the conclusions.

Term	What it means here
Standalone, group	Standalone accounts show Chilime alone, with investments at cost. Group (consolidated) accounts add subsidiaries line by line and include a share of associates’ profit or loss.
Associate, equity method	A company in which Chilime has significant influence but not control. Its profit or loss is added to the group in proportion to the shareholding; cash comes only as dividends.
Deemed energy, excess energy	The power purchase agreement fixes a yearly quantity (132.917 GWh) paid at the regular rate; energy above it is paid at a lower excess rate.
Capacity factor	Energy produced divided by what the plant would make running at full capacity all year.
Corporate guarantee	A promise to pay a lender if the borrower does not. It is not on the balance sheet unless a payment becomes probable.
Capitalised interest	Interest added to the loan balance during construction instead of being paid.
Qualified opinion	An auditor’s opinion that the accounts are fair except for a stated matter.
GWh, MW	A gigawatt-hour is a million units (kWh). A megawatt is capacity; generation is capacity multiplied by hours run.
BOOT	Build, own, operate, transfer: the plant passes to the Government when the licence ends.

Plain-language definitions for this file; not legal or accounting advice.

What does this establish, and what comes next?

16. What this establishes, and what it does not

Chilime is an NEA-controlled company whose 22.1 MW plant earned a steady profit at a fixed Rs 8.17 a unit for two decades, until it stopped on 26 Aug 2026.
It used that plant to promote three project companies, putting in Rs 657 crore of shares, Rs 161 crore of loans and guarantees for Rs 4,134 crore of their EPF debt.
The cash that has come back is interest and one small dividend from the engineering company; the hydropower companies all have accumulated losses.
Of 292.4 MW in the portfolio, only Madhya Bhotekoshi’s 102 MW runs normally today.
The group earns about half what the company does, and the largest commitment, the guarantees, sits outside the contingent-liability table.

One plant. Three promises. One running.

When a company guarantees debts larger than itself for projects it does not control, which number are you valuing: its profit, or its promises?

Which hydropower company, or which promoter, deserves the next KYC?

This file establishes how Chilime was built and financed, what it invested in and guaranteed, how its standalone and group profits differ, what the 2025 and 2026 floods did to it, who controls it and what the legal record shows, up to 20 Oct 2026. It does not establish the guarantee terms, the repair cost, the insurance cover, or when the plant will run again.

The question for the next episode is the guarantee. On what terms did Chilime guarantee the EPF’s loans, and what will happen to Rasuwagadhi’s? The audited accounts to mid-July 2026, due around January 2027, are the first place an answer could appear.

सारांश (नेपालीमा). चिलिमे जलविद्युत कम्पनीले २२.१ मेगावाटको आफ्नै केन्द्रबाट कमाएको नाफाले सान्जेन, मध्य भोटेकोशी र रसुवागढी आयोजनामा लगानी गर्‍यो र ती कम्पनीले कर्मचारी सञ्चय कोषबाट लिएको करिब रु ४,१३४ करोड ऋणको जमानत दियो, जुन कम्पनीको आफ्नै पूँजीको ३.६ गुणा हो। २०८३ भदौ १० को बाढीले चिलिमे केन्द्र बन्द गर्‍यो र रसुवागढी आयोजना फेरि ध्वस्त बनायो। हालको अवस्थामा पोर्टफोलियोको २९२.४ मेगावाटमध्ये मध्य भोटेकोशीको १०२ मेगावाट मात्र सामान्य रूपमा चलिरहेको छ।

CHCL intrinsic value: the sum of the parts. Our valuation of 20 October 2026, built on the numbers in this file.
Rasuwagadhi after the flood. Our 6 October 2026 valuation of the project company Chilime guarantees.
All Know Your Company files. Surya Nepal, Dabur Nepal, Bottlers Nepal, Shivam Cements, Salt Trading Corporation, Kumari Bank and Chilime.

Sources & further reading

Checked 20 October 2026. Educational research, not investment advice.