KYC #02

Dabur Nepal: You know the brands. Who buys the factory’s output?

Real juice, Hajmola, Vatika: you know them from the shelf. About two-thirds of what Dabur Nepal sells goes to its owner in India, and in the latest year that was the part that held.

The short version

Two-thirds of sales go to the owner. Dabur India bought ₹659.89 crore (Rs 1,056 crore) of goods in the year to March 2026, about 70% of revenue. The rating agency puts it at about 64% of gross sales in 2024/25.
The slump sat outside the owner’s purchases. Revenue fell 5.8% and profit 27.4%. Purchases recorded by Dabur India rose 0.2%. The rest of revenue, a proxy for mostly Nepali sales, fell 17%.
The dependence runs both ways. Goods from Dabur Nepal equal about 99% of what Dabur India reports buying, as goods and services, from all its subsidiaries. In 2015 Dabur India told its exchange a Nepal supply disruption could hit Real juice sales in India.
The year-end balance owed rose 122%. Dabur India owed Dabur Nepal ₹250.27 crore for goods at March 2026, up from ₹112.73 crore. It is an unpaid balance, not a loss or a default, and the filing does not say why.

The question: How did a Nepali factory come to sell two-thirds of its output to its own owner, and what did the latest bad year reveal about that arrangement?

The numbers

Operating income: Rs 1,506 crore. Year to mid-July 2025, audited, down 6.8% from Rs 1,617 crore. The only open source for it is the rating agency.
Sold to Dabur India: 64%. Share of gross sales that were exports to Dabur India, year to mid-July 2025. On Dabur’s own March-year accounts we get 70%.
Profit after tax: Rs 130 crore. Year to March 2026: ₹81.10 crore at INR 1 = NPR 1.60. Down 27.4% from Rs 179 crore.
Owed by Dabur India: Rs 400 crore. For goods, 31 March 2026: ₹250.27 crore, against ₹112.73 crore a year earlier. The filing gives no reason.
Dabur India’s subsidiary purchases: 99%. Dabur Nepal goods (₹659.89 crore) as a share of the ₹668.28 crore Dabur India reports for goods and services bought from all subsidiaries, year to March 2026. The two lines are not perfectly like-for-like.

01. The year the shelf shrank and the customer didn’t

In the year to March 2026, Dabur Nepal’s revenue fell 5.8 percent and its profit fell 27.4 percent.⁵

One customer did not flinch. Dabur India, which owns 97.5 percent of the company, bought ₹659.89 crore of goods from it, ₹1.19 crore more than the year before. In Nepali rupees that is Rs 1,056 crore.⁶

Subtract the parent’s purchases from revenue and the rest fell from ₹347.30 crore to ₹287.71 crore: down 17.2 percent. This is a proxy for the rest of the business, predominantly Nepal’s domestic market, not a separately reported figure for Nepal-only sales: it also includes any export to other buyers and other income, and the rating agency says nearly all exports go to Dabur India. The fall in this line (₹59.59 crore) is slightly larger than the fall in total revenue (₹58.40 crore).^1,5,6,9

Mar 23: bought by Dabur India 100, rest of revenue (a calculated proxy) 100 (March 2023 = 100)
Mar 24: bought by Dabur India 114, rest of revenue (a calculated proxy) 101 (March 2023 = 100)
Mar 25: bought by Dabur India 119, rest of revenue (a calculated proxy) 99 (March 2023 = 100)
Mar 26: bought by Dabur India 119, rest of revenue (a calculated proxy) 82 (March 2023 = 100)

Real juice, Hajmola, Vatika. You have probably bought something this company made or sold. But the biggest buyer of what its factory produces is not a Nepali shopper. It is its owner, across the border.

That makes the slump easier to read than the headline suggests, and harder to dismiss. Easier, because it tells you where the weakness was. Harder, because it asks what kind of company this is.

How did a Nepali factory come to sell two-thirds of its output to its own owner, and what did the latest bad year reveal about that arrangement?

02. Everything you recognise is on the shelf, and the factory behind it

Real. Hajmola. Vatika. Dabur Red. Chyawanprash. Honey. The names are so ordinary in a Nepali kitchen or bathroom that few people ask where they are made.^1,7

For many of them, the answer is Dabur Nepal Private Limited. It makes Real juice in about 40 variants and sells it with hair oil, toothpaste, digestives and honey through more than 300 distributors that supply about 1 lakh shops.¹ Dabur says its brands are “mostly market leaders” in the Nepali categories where they compete. That is the company’s claim, not a measured share.⁹

It is a manufacturer, not a sales office. The juice and consumer-goods plant is at Birgunj, in the industrial belt that runs into Bara. A division at Banepa grows medicinal-plant seedlings in greenhouses and satellite nurseries.^7,13

The company is registered in Nepal, but 97.5 percent of it is held, through an Isle of Man subsidiary, by Dabur India. The rating agency credits the group’s research and standard procedures for much of its edge.¹

Start with what the factory makes. Foods, mainly juice, have been about 70 percent of revenue “over the years”, the rating agency says, though only 60 percent in 2019/20, when juice consumption fell in the lockdown and demand for consumer-care products rose.^1,3

The raw materials are pulp, concentrates and sugar. Pulp and concentrate prices swing with crops, and because the inputs are perishable the company cannot hold them for long. Nepal’s sugar rules have bitten before: import duty rose from 30 to 40 percent and imports were banned from October 2018 to July 2019, so the company bought sugar locally at higher prices.³

Beyond juice, the shelf has been widening. In 2025/26 Dabur Nepal launched Dynamite Energy Drink, Hajmola Minis, Vatika Onion Shampoo, Burrst Mango and Hajmola Jeera, began making Odonil gel pockets at Birgunj, and started producing Odopic dishwash bars in what Dabur calls a “2P facility”, after Nepal opened 2P and 3P manufacturing to multinationals.⁷

In February 2022 Investment Board Nepal approved a Rs 968 crore expansion, mainly for beverages including juice. The reported funding was Rs 660 crore of short-term and Rs 50 crore of long-term bank loans, the rest the company’s own.¹⁷ Yet in every rating report we read, through the year to mid-July 2025, the agency says the company has no long-term debt. Its only borrowings are short-term working-capital lines.^1,2,3

Both can be true. The Rs 660 crore of “short-term loans” matches the Rs 660 crore of working-capital limits the agency rates, so some of what was described as investment may be credit lines rather than spending. The company has not said how much was spent.^1,17

A real factory, with a widening shelf. But who is it making the goods for, and why in Nepal?

03. Herbs, a footpath and a prime minister’s visit

The only first-hand account of why Dabur came to Nepal that we could find is a 2002 interview with one of its directors, TK Gupta, in the Nepali Times. It is one man’s recollection, twenty-four years old, and we treat it as that.³⁰

Registration began in 1989, he said, “because the Himalaya is a storehouse of herbs and medicinal plants and also because there was a local market for our products”.³⁰

The market was bigger than the books showed. When he first came, in February 1991, Dabur was selling Rs 80 to 90 lakh of goods a year in Nepal. Then: “I was passing through Asan and saw Dabur products on the footpath, selling at double our price.” Trading began that May. A factory was producing by November 1992.³⁰

December 1992 is where the story changes shape. Gupta says India’s prime minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, visited Nepal and “eased the procedural delays in export by allowing His Majesty’s Government to certify material content (50 percent)”. “This was an opportunity,” he said, “and in 1993 we began with major expansion.”³⁰

The decision that shaped everything after came in 1996. After the trade treaty was renewed, Dabur “purchased a local fruit juice factory and that was the beginning of Real juices, which are now the leading fruit juices in India. All the products sold there go from Nepal.”³⁰

By 2002, Gupta said, Dabur had invested Rs 110 crore. Turnover was about Rs 260 crore, and the company exported about 92 percent of what it made. Local sales were about Rs 22 crore.^30,31

What the interview documents is what the company says it did and when. It does not publish the origin rules, the wage bill or the tax terms, so we cannot say Nepal was cheaper. It even contains a counter-example: West Bengal offered a 25 percent capital subsidy and a 60 percent interest subsidy, and Dabur decided to take a plant to Siliguri. Our reading: the interview points to access, a treaty route into the Indian market, rather than incentives. We have not checked whether the rules it describes still apply.³⁰

1989: Registration begins. Dabur registers a Nepali company to gather Himalayan herbs and serve a local market that was already buying its goods. Its director found Dabur products selling on a Kathmandu footpath “at double our price”.
1992: The factory starts. Production began by November 1992. In December, by the director’s account, the Indian prime minister’s visit eased export certification, and in 1993 the company “began with major expansion”.
1996: A juice factory becomes Real. After the trade treaty’s renewal Dabur bought a local fruit-juice factory. By 2002 its director called Real “the leading fruit juices in India” and said “all the products sold there go from Nepal”.
2002: The 92 percent year. Turnover about Rs 260 crore, invested Rs 110 crore, about 92% of output exported, local sales about Rs 22 crore. Our baseline for how far the company has moved.
2005: Dabur India takes 97.5%. Raised from 80%, per Kantipur’s 2011 report (a single source). Why is not stated. A Nepali investor keeps 2.5%.
2010: The first raid. In December the anti-graft body CIAA raided Dabur Nepal’s premises over wrong manufacturing dates; a petition sought to cancel its licence. The company denied it. Outcome not found.
2015: The blockade year. Border closures stopped supply; Dabur India told its exchange that Real juice sales in India could suffer. On 13 December 77 container trucks were impounded at Birgunj; a Post report said no substantial evidence was found.
2020: Lockdown. Gross revenue fell 22% to Rs 882 crore in the year to mid-July 2020 and the operating margin (before depreciation, interest and tax) to 11.4%. Exports were 59% of gross revenue.
2022: A Rs 968 crore plan. Investment Board Nepal approved an expansion to add capacity, mostly for beverages. The rating agency still shows no long-term debt through 2024/25.
2023/24: The peak. Income from operations rose 18.7% to Rs 1,617 crore; exports grew 29% to Rs 1,098.5 crore, 7.21% of all Nepal’s exports.
2025: The shelf softens. Income fell 6.8% to Rs 1,506 crore in the year to mid-July 2025. In September protests closed markets and burned some large stores.
2026: Profit falls 27%. Year to March 2026: revenue down 5.8%, profit down 27.4%, parent’s purchases up 0.2%, balance owed by the parent up 122%.

Six turning points and two voices, with the evidence

The history is easier to follow as a set of moves. Each card below shows what happened, why it mattered, what changed and what followed.

1992 to 1993: A factory and a certification rule. What happened: Dabur Nepal’s factory began producing in November 1992. A month later, in a Dabur director’s account, the Indian prime minister’s visit let the Nepali government certify 50 percent material content, which “eased the procedural delays in export”. Why it mattered: Easier export paperwork turned a Nepali factory from a supplier to Nepal into a supplier to India as well. The director calls it “an opportunity”. (His account; the rule itself we could not check.) What changed: In 1993, he says, “we began with major expansion”. By 2002 about 92 percent of output was exported. The long-term consequence: The company’s centre of gravity was India from the start. Much of its history since is how far the Nepali market has pulled it back.
1996: A juice factory becomes Real. What happened: After the renewal of the trade treaty in 1996, Dabur bought a local fruit-juice factory. Why it mattered: It gave Dabur a product that could be made in Nepal and sold under a famous brand in India. (Our reading.) What changed: By 2002 the director called Real “the leading fruit juices in India”, said “all the products sold there go from Nepal” and described a unit running at 6,000 litres an hour. The long-term consequence: Foods, mainly juice, are still about 70 percent of revenue, and juices and digestives are what Dabur Nepal mainly exports to Dabur India.
2005: Control to 97.5 percent. What happened: Dabur India raised its stake in Dabur Nepal from 80 to 97.5 percent, per a 2011 report from Kantipur. This is a single source. Why it mattered: Why is not stated. A larger stake means the group keeps nearly all of what the business earns. (Our reading.) What changed: The rest is held by a Nepali investor. The rating agency’s 2021 report lists Rukma Shamsher Rana as chairman and managing director and a director since the company began. The long-term consequence: A Nepali chair on a company that is, financially, almost wholly owned abroad.
2015: The blockade. What happened: Border crossings with India were blockaded during the Tarai unrest. Dabur India told its stock exchange that supply from Dabur Nepal had been affected and that Real juice sales in India could suffer. Why it mattered: Dabur had to tell investors because Real juice sold in India came largely from Nepal. The Kathmandu Post put Nepal at 70 to 75 percent of Dabur’s juice production. What changed: Dabur raised production in India and Sri Lanka. On 13 December 77 container trucks of Dabur Nepal goods were impounded at Birgunj on suspicion of wrong dates; the Post reported no substantial evidence was found. The long-term consequence: The clearest public proof that dependence runs both ways, and that the group could re-route when it had to.
2021/22 to 2023/24: The export surge. What happened: Income from operations went from Rs 1,302 crore to Rs 1,617 crore in two years. Exports grew 29 percent in 2023/24 to Rs 1,098.5 crore. In February 2022 the Investment Board approved a Rs 968 crore expansion. Why it mattered: Demand from the group for Nepal-made juice and digestives grew faster than Nepal’s own market, whose sales rose 5.5 percent in 2023/24. (Our reading from the agency’s growth rates.) What changed: Exports reached 7.21 percent of all Nepal’s exports. The operating margin rose to 17.0 percent on price rises. The long-term consequence: The company that came out of the surge was larger and more dependent: about 64 percent of gross sales went to Dabur India in 2023/24, up from about 60 percent in the three years before.
2024/25 to 2025/26: The reversal. What happened: Income from operations fell 6.8 percent in the year to mid-July 2025. Revenue fell a further 5.8 percent in the year to March 2026 and profit fell 27.4 percent. Why it mattered: It is the second fall since the 2020 lockdown and the first test of the export-heavy model after the surge. What changed: Dabur India’s purchases held. The rest of revenue fell 17 percent. The year-end balance owed by Dabur India rose 122 percent. The long-term consequence: Too early to call a trend: the rating agency reported no long-term debt as of mid-July 2025, and reserves are bigger than a year ago. The open question is the Nepali franchise.

Two people are on the record, and each carries a warning.

TK Gupta (Dabur director, interviewed in 2002). Began registering the company in 1989, arrived in 1991 and, by his account, bought the local juice factory in 1996 that became Real. By 2002 about 92 percent of output was exported and turnover was about Rs 260 crore. The only first-hand account of why the company is in Nepal that we could find: one director’s recollection, twenty-four years old. We do not know his current role.³⁰
Rukma Shamsher Rana (Chairman and managing director in 2021, per the rating agency). A director “since its establishment”, per the 2021 report; a former member of parliament, Nepal’s ambassador to India and president of the Nepal Olympic Committee. myRepublica names him as the Nepali holder of 2.5 percent; another outlet names someone else.^3,17,18 No business decision of his is on the public record. His importance is structural: a Nepali board member from the start and chairman by 2021. Whether he still holds the post is not in the 2026 report.
Mohit Malhotra (Chief executive, Dabur India). Said in February 2025 that Nepal was “one of our fastest growing overseas markets” and that Dabur was “among the oldest and the largest Indian enterprises” there.²⁰ The year to mid-July 2025 ended with income down 6.8 percent. A reminder of how quickly the story turned. Dabur’s 2024-25 annual report calls the outlook for Nepal “challenging”.⁹

In 2002 it exported 92 percent. Today it is about two-thirds. First: who owns it?

04. Who owns it, who buys from it, who gets the cash

Three relationships are tangled together here, and they are easy to confuse. Ownership is who holds the shares. Commercial dealings are who buys from and sells to whom. Money flows are where the cash ends up. Click any box.

Dabur India Limited (100%). The listed Indian group. The rating agency calls it the “ultimate holding company”. It owns Dabur International outright and is also Dabur Nepal’s largest customer. Its consolidated revenue was ₹13,192.57 crore in the year to March 2026; Dabur Nepal contributed 4.23% of group profit (6.26% a year earlier). Group figures are never Dabur Nepal’s.
Dabur International Ltd (97.5%). Holds 97.5% of Dabur Nepal and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Dabur India (Form AOC-1 lists it since 14 September 2003). Why the stake sits in an Isle of Man company is not explained. Holding companies of this kind are common in multinational groups, and we draw no inference.
Nepali investor (2.5%). myRepublica names Rukma Shumsher Rana; EastMojo names Ishori Rana (both February 2022). The rating agency lists Rukma Shamsher Rana as chairman and managing director in 2021 and a director since the company was set up. Dabur’s accounts show this 2.5% as minority interest: ₹21.90 crore of ₹875.55 crore net assets at March 2026.
Foods and beverages. About 70% of revenue “over the years” (rating agency); 60% in the lockdown year. Real in about 40 variants. Raw materials: pulp, concentrates, sugar. Juice and beverage competition rose in 2024/25.
Health care. Digestives are exported to Dabur India with the juices. Domestic launches in 2025/26 include Hajmola Minis and Hajmola Jeera.
Home and personal care. Vatika, Dabur Amla and Prostyle hair oils, Red toothpaste. Local manufacturing is widening: Odonil gel pockets at Birgunj and Odopic dishwash bars in what Dabur calls a “2P facility”, after Nepal opened 2P and 3P manufacturing to multinationals.
Herbs. A Medicinal and Aromatic Plants Division at Banepa, with satellite nurseries and cultivation sites “from 90 m to 3500 m altitude”. The 1989 reason for coming is still on the books; its size is not disclosed.
Exports to Dabur India. About 64% of gross sales in 2024/25 and “almost entire export sales”. Exports were Rs 1,098.5 crore in 2023/24, 7.21% of Nepal’s exports.
Dabur India, as buyer. Dabur India bought ₹659.89 crore (Rs 1,056 crore) of goods in the year to March 2026 and still owed ₹250.27 crore (Rs 400 crore) at year-end: 138 days of purchases against 62 a year earlier (our arithmetic). That is a customer’s account, not a dividend.
Nepal’s tax authorities. Income-tax provision Rs 49 crore (₹30.75 crore) in the year to March 2026, 27.5% of pre-tax profit, against 20.6% a year earlier. The Inland Revenue Department honoured Dabur Nepal as top taxpayer in export of goods for 2024/25 without publishing the amount. VAT, customs and payroll taxes are not disclosed.
Kept in Nepal. No dividend appears in the three years we can test: net assets rose each year by exactly that year’s profit. Reserves are up Rs 330 crore in two years. Some of what is “kept” may sit in the balance Dabur India owes (our reading; the filing gives no cash figure).

Ownership is simple. Dabur India owns Dabur International outright, and Dabur International holds 97.5 percent of Dabur Nepal.^1,5 The rest belongs to a Nepali investor whom the press names inconsistently: Rukma Shumsher Rana in myRepublica, Ishori Rana in EastMojo, both February 2022. We name neither as the shareholder.^17,18 The rating agency lists Rukma Shamsher Rana as chairman and managing director in 2021 and a director since the company was set up.³

The commercial dealings are the story: Dabur India is Dabur Nepal’s biggest customer and, as section 6 shows, Nepal is one of Dabur India’s biggest suppliers.

The money flows are the part to read slowly. No dividend appears in the three years we can test: Dabur’s notes show net assets rising each year by exactly that year’s profit.^5,9,10 In the group’s accounts Dabur Nepal is 4.23 percent of group profit and 7.35 percent of net assets in the year to March 2026 (6.26 and 7.07 percent a year earlier).^5,9

Compare Surya Nepal (KYC #01), which paid out about 95 percent of its profit. Dabur Nepal’s accounts show none paid out, but a rising balance owed by its owner. The two are doing opposite things with their profit. The reason for Dabur Nepal’s choice is not disclosed.

If the profit stays and the customer is the owner, what does the revenue look like?

05. From 92 percent to two-thirds

Start with the mix. In 2002 a company director said Dabur Nepal exported about 92 percent of what it made.³⁰ By the year to mid-July 2020 the rating agency put exports at 59 percent of gross revenue, and 99.51 percent of those exports went to Dabur India.³ Since then the share has crept back up.

2002 · a director’s interview: 92% (Share of products exported)
Year to Jul 2020 · rating agency: 59.15% (Exports ÷ gross revenue)
Years to Jul 2021 to 2023 · rating agency: 60% (About 60%, same measure)
Year to Jul 2024 · rating agency: 64% (Sales to Dabur India ÷ gross sales)
Year to Jul 2025 · rating agency: 64% (Same)
Year to Mar 2026 · our arithmetic: 69.6% (Parent’s purchases ÷ revenue, Dabur’s filings)

Read the labels: these are different measures from different sources. The trend is what matters. Local sales grew from about Rs 22 crore in 2002 to something like Rs 500 crore by 2023/24, a more than twenty-fold rise, and exports grew too, more slowly until the recent surge.

The Rs 500 crore is our estimate: income from operations less export sales in the year to mid-July 2024 (Rs 1,616.5 crore less Rs 1,098.5 crore, about Rs 518 crore). The two figures are on slightly different bases, so treat it as an order of magnitude.^2,30

Now zoom in on the four years Dabur’s own accounts let us split cleanly: what its parent bought, and the rest of revenue.

Mar 23: Rs 886.4 crore to Dabur India, Rs 560.8 crore rest of revenue (proxy)
Mar 24: Rs 1,008.3 crore to Dabur India, Rs 568.2 crore rest of revenue (proxy)
Mar 25: Rs 1,053.9 crore to Dabur India, Rs 555.7 crore rest of revenue (proxy)
Mar 26: Rs 1,055.8 crore to Dabur India, Rs 460.3 crore rest of revenue (proxy)

Years to 31 March. Dabur India’s filings; ₹ crore × 1.6.

Between the years to March 2023 and March 2026 the parent’s purchases rose 19 percent, from Rs 886 crore to Rs 1,056 crore. The rest of revenue was flat for two years, then fell 17 percent.

Why this matters. The parent’s purchases follow one owner’s decisions. The rest of revenue, mostly Nepal’s domestic sales, reflects thousands of shoppers. The two behaved differently in the same year.

Two-thirds to one customer defines this company. What does it do to the company, and to the customer?

06. The factory the parent depends on

Customer concentration usually means a small supplier at the mercy of a big buyer. Here it also describes a buyer that would struggle without its supplier.

The evidence is in Dabur India’s own accounts. In the year to March 2026 its standalone company reported ₹668.28 crore of purchases of goods and services from all its subsidiaries. Its purchases of goods from Dabur Nepal were ₹659.89 crore, about 99 percent of that line. One is goods only and the other adds services, so the two are not perfectly like-for-like, but the scale is clear.⁶

Against its line “purchases of stock-in-trade”, ₹1,581.31 crore, Dabur Nepal’s goods equal 41.7 percent, if they are booked there, which the filing does not say.⁶

Dabur Nepal: revenue sold to Dabur India: 69.6% (Year to March 2026)
Dabur India: Nepal’s goods as a share of its purchases from all subsidiaries: 98.7% (₹659.89 of ₹668.28 crore (goods against goods and services))
Dabur India: Nepal’s goods against “purchases of stock-in-trade”: 41.7% (₹659.89 of ₹1,581.31 crore, if booked there)
Dabur group: Dabur Nepal’s share of group profit: 4.23% (Year to March 2026 (6.26% a year earlier))
Dabur group: Dabur Nepal’s share of net assets: 7.35% (At 31 March 2026 (7.07% a year earlier))

For scale: Real sits inside Dabur India’s Foods and Beverages business, ₹1,860 crore of revenue in 2025/26 and 20 percent of its India FMCG sales.⁸ A purchase price and a selling price are not the same thing, and Nepal also sends digestives, so this is a rough comparison. It still says Nepal’s output is not a rounding error in the group’s Indian business.

This is not new. In October 2015, with border crossings blockaded during the Tarai unrest, Dabur India told its stock exchange that supply from Dabur Nepal “has been affected” and that this “may temporarily impact” sales of Real juices in India. It said it would ramp up production at its other plants in India and in Sri Lanka.¹¹ The Kathmandu Post wrote that about 70 to 75 percent of Dabur’s juice production came from its Nepal factory. That is one newspaper’s figure, not Dabur’s.¹³

On 13 December 2015 an anti-graft team impounded 77 container trucks of Dabur Nepal goods at Birgunj on a suspicion that the dates on the packs were wrong. The Post reported that “no substantial evidence” was found; the company said it was not exporting expired products.^14,15

What does Nepal supply? The rating agency says Dabur Nepal mainly exports juices and digestives, almost all to Dabur India.¹ The documented reasons for Nepal are in section 3: access, a juice factory bought in 1996 and a treaty route. Cheaper labour or lower taxes are plausible, but no document we found says so.

On transfer pricing. Sales between a parent and a subsidiary in different countries are normal, and they are reported. What is disclosed here: annual totals and year-end balances, and the two sets of books agree. Dabur India reports ₹658.70 crore of purchases in the year to March 2025; the rating agency’s data imply about ₹643 crore of exports in the year to mid-July 2025. What is not disclosed: the price basis, the margin on those sales, and whether any tax authority has looked. Nothing here suggests mispricing, and we do not suggest it.^9,1,21

If the arrangement works for both sides, why did the numbers fall?

07. Two calendars, one company, one peak

Here is every year of operating income the rating agency has published for Dabur Nepal, next to Dabur India’s own series.

Income from operations, years to mid-July, Rs crore

Jul 17: Rs 993.7 crore
Jul 18: Rs 1,001.0 crore
Jul 19: Rs 1,025.6 crore
Jul 20: Rs 809.6 crore (Lockdown)
Jul 21: not disclosed
Jul 22: Rs 1,301.8 crore
Jul 23: Rs 1,361.5 crore
Jul 24: Rs 1,616.5 crore
Jul 25: Rs 1,506.2 crore (Latest)

Rating agency, audited. 2021 is missing: no release we could retrieve gives it. Axis starts at zero.

Revenue, years to 31 March, Rs crore

Mar 23: Rs 1,447.2 crore
Mar 24: Rs 1,576.5 crore
Mar 25: Rs 1,609.6 crore
Mar 26: Rs 1,516.2 crore (Latest)

Dabur India’s filings: ₹ crore × 1.6. Revenue as summarised in the minority-interest note. Do not read across panels: the twelve months differ.

Three things stand out. The 2020 lockdown cut income 21 percent. Between that year and mid-July 2024 income doubled, from Rs 810 crore to Rs 1,617 crore. Then in the year to mid-July 2025 it fell 6.8 percent to Rs 1,506 crore.^1,2,3

The decline starts at a peak. Rs 1,506 crore is still 15.7 percent above 2021/22 and 86 percent above the lockdown year.

Margins followed revenue. Operating profit before depreciation, interest and tax (PBILDT) rose from a margin of 13.9 percent to 17.0 percent in 2023/24, mainly on price rises, then eased to 15.9 percent in 2024/25. The agency puts that down to higher discounts. In rupees PBILDT fell about 13 percent, from roughly Rs 274 crore to Rs 239 crore (our arithmetic).^1,2

The agency says both domestic and export sales declined, and that domestic sales were hit by “increased competition in the juice and beverage segment, a softening consumption trend in the country owing to outward migration, and a generally challenged economic environment”.¹

	Rating agency (CARE)	Dabur India’s filings
Year ends	Mid-July (Nepal’s statutory year)	31 March (Dabur India’s year)
Latest year	To mid-July 2025	To 31 March 2026
Revenue measure	Income from operations, net of taxes; audited	“Revenue” in the subsidiary note, before eliminations
Latest revenue	Rs 1,506.2 crore	Rs 1,516.2 crore (₹947.60 crore)
Change on the year before	-6.8% (from Rs 1,616.5 crore)	-5.8% (from Rs 1,609.6 crore, itself +2.1%)
Export measure	~64% of gross revenue	Parent’s purchases ÷ revenue: 69.6%
Currency	Nepali rupees	₹ crore × 1.6, the peg

Sources: ^1,2,5,9. Same company, same currency, two different twelve-month windows. We show them side by side and never splice them.

Why this matters. On Dabur’s calendar revenue rose 2.1 percent in the year to March 2025 and fell 5.8 percent in the year to March 2026. On the agency’s it fell 6.8 percent in the year to mid-July 2025. Neither is wrong. They are different windows on the same slowdown, and Rs 1,506 crore and Rs 1,516 crore are not the same year.

So what actually changed in the latest year?

08. What shrank, what held and what may have caused it

Dabur’s accounts let us look inside the latest year. Click through the stages for the year to March 2025, then March 2026.

Year to March 2025

Revenue: Rs 1,610 crore (₹1,006.00 crore). Revenue as Dabur summarises it, before inter-company eliminations; up 2.1% on the year to March 2024. The rating agency’s separate series, for the year to mid-July 2025, is Rs 1,506 crore (down 6.8%). Same company, different twelve months.
Sold to Dabur India: Rs 1,054 crore (65.5% of revenue). ₹658.70 crore of goods bought by Dabur India, from its own accounts. The rating agency’s figure for the year to mid-July 2025 is about 64% of gross sales; Dabur’s annual report says “around 65%”.
Rest of revenue (proxy): Rs 556 crore (mostly Nepal’s shelf). Revenue less the parent’s purchases (₹347.30 crore). Mostly domestic sales; it also includes any other export and other income, which the agency says is small.
Profit after tax: Rs 179 crore (11.1% of revenue). Pre-tax profit Rs 225 crore (₹140.70 crore), income tax Rs 46 crore (₹28.92 crore, 20.6%), profit after tax ₹111.78 crore. 4.6% lower than the year before.
What stays: Rs 1,271 crore (net assets · no dividend). Net assets (₹794.45 crore) rose by exactly the year’s profit, so nothing was paid out. Dabur India owed ₹112.73 crore (Rs 180 crore) for goods at year-end: 62 days of purchases.

Year to March 2026

Revenue: Rs 1,516 crore (₹947.60 crore). Down 5.8% on the year to March 2025, per Dabur’s accounts. Nepali press later repeated it in Nepali rupees.
Sold to Dabur India: Rs 1,056 crore (69.6% of revenue). ₹659.89 crore: ₹1.19 crore (0.2%) more than a year earlier. The parent’s share rose because the rest of revenue shrank.
Rest of revenue (proxy): Rs 460 crore (down 17.2%). ₹287.71 crore against ₹347.30 crore: Rs 95 crore less. That is the whole fall in revenue (₹58.40 crore) and a little more.
Profit after tax: Rs 130 crore (8.6% of revenue). Pre-tax profit Rs 179 crore (₹111.85 crore, down 20.5%); tax Rs 49 crore (₹30.75 crore), which rose 6.3%, so tax took 27.5% of profit against 20.6%. Profit after tax ₹81.10 crore, down 27.4%. Why the tax rate rose is not disclosed.
What stays: Rs 1,401 crore (net assets · no dividend). Net assets (₹875.55 crore) rose by exactly the year’s profit. But Dabur India owed ₹250.27 crore (Rs 400 crore) for goods on 31 March: 138 days of purchases against 62, up 122%. A large shipment not yet paid for is the innocent explanation; a longer credit period is the other. The accounts do not say which.

The pattern: revenue down, parent’s purchases flat, the rest of revenue down 17 percent, profit down 27 percent, and the balance owed by the parent up 122 percent.

Why? There are three voices. Management says Nepal is seeing “significant drop in consumption and accelerated down-trading”, that the domestic business is hit by “weak demand, credit challenges, and a significant slowdown in discretionary spending categories”, and that the September 2025 protests “significantly disrupted sales operations due to market closure and some large modern trade stores being burnt”.⁷ The rating agency points to weaker domestic demand, juice competition, outward migration, stretched operating cycles and higher discounts.¹ The third voice is ours. We weigh each cause against the evidence for and against it. Open a card.

Weak Nepali demand, migration, down-trading: Best supported. For: The rating agency cites a “softening consumption trend ... owing to outward migration”. Dabur’s directors’ report says Nepal sees a significant drop in consumption and accelerated down-trading. The rest of revenue (a proxy) fell 17.2%. Against: No category data is published. Peers diverged: Bottlers Nepal’s profit rose 281% in a quarter while Unilever Nepal’s income fell 11%. The best-supported explanation for the fall at home.
The September 2025 protests: Partly. For: Dabur’s report says market closures and burned modern-trade stores “significantly disrupted sales operations”. Unilever Nepal’s Q1 income fell 11%. Against: The fall began earlier: the agency’s year to mid-July 2025 already shows income down 6.8%, before September. An aggravator, not the start.
Juice and beverage competition: Plausible. For: The rating agency names “increased competition in the juice and beverage segment”. Against: No market-share data is public, so the size of the effect is unknown. Plausible, unquantified.
Lower purchases by Dabur India: Not supported. For: The agency says export sales declined in the year to mid-July 2025 (about 6% on our arithmetic). Against: Dabur’s purchases were flat (+0.2%) in the year to March 2026, the year of the biggest fall in profit. Modest in 2024/25; not the cause in 2025/26.
Higher discounts and mix: Plausible. For: The agency attributes the margin fall in 2024/25 “mainly to higher discounts”. Against: Margin by channel is not disclosed, so we cannot tell whether domestic or export sales carry the better margin. Plausible for the margin; unmeasured.
India’s GST cut, working capital, other: Unknown. For: Dabur moved juices to the 5% slab after September 2025. The agency notes “stretched operating cycles across the industry”. Against: No shipment data after the cut; no receivables ageing. The balance owed by the parent more than doubled for reasons not given. Cannot be assessed from public disclosures.

Our assessment: a Nepali demand shock most plausibly hit what the company sells at home, and Dabur India’s purchases did not move. Profit fell faster than revenue because pre-tax profit fell 20.5 percent while the tax charge rose 6.3 percent, so tax took 27.5 percent of profit against 20.6 percent. We cannot say whether domestic sales carry higher margins than the sales to the parent; that is plausible, and undisclosed. We cannot say why the tax rate rose.^5,9

And the receivable. At 31 March 2026 Dabur India owed Dabur Nepal ₹250.27 crore for goods, or Rs 400 crore. A year earlier it was ₹112.73 crore. That is 138 days of purchases, against 62.^6,9 The innocent explanation is timing: a large March shipment not yet paid for. The other is a longer credit period. The filing does not say which, and we make no claim.

Why this matters. A revenue slump is not automatically a health problem: the rating agency reported no long-term debt through mid-July 2025, and Dabur’s summary shows only ₹16.98 crore (Rs 27 crore) of non-current liabilities at March 2026.^1,5 The number to watch is the balance owed by the owner. Dabur’s accounts for the year to March 2027 will show whether it was timing.

Does depending on one customer make this a strong company or a fragile one?

Eight things most readers don’t know

Open a card for why it matters.

In 2002 a Dabur director said about 92 percent of what the company made was exported and local sales were about Rs 22 crore. By 2023/24 sales other than exports were something like Rs 518 crore. Why it matters: The Nepali business has grown more than twenty-fold in two decades, and still became the smaller half. The export line grew faster. (Our estimate: income from operations less exports, two slightly different bases.)
Dabur Nepal’s share of Nepal’s exports halved, from 7.21 percent to 3.71 percent, while its own exports fell only about 6 percent. Why it matters: Nepal’s total recorded exports rose 82 percent that year. Had Dabur’s exports not fallen at all, the share would still have dropped to 3.96 percent. A share can halve while the company barely moves.
The balance Dabur India owed Dabur Nepal for goods more than doubled in a year: ₹112.73 crore to ₹250.27 crore. Why it matters: Measured in days of purchases it went from 62 to 138. The innocent reading is a large March shipment. The accounts do not say.
Goods from Dabur Nepal equal about 99 percent of the goods and services Dabur India’s own accounts show buying from all its subsidiaries. Why it matters: The usual story of concentration is a small supplier and a big buyer. This one is a buyer that would have to find the goods somewhere else.
Two numbers that look like the same year are not: Rs 1,506 crore and Rs 1,516 crore. Why it matters: The first is the rating agency’s year to mid-July 2025; the second is Dabur’s year to March 2026. They are ten crore apart and describe different twelve months, and both fell.
In three years, Dabur Nepal’s net assets rose by exactly what it earned: ₹565.56 crore to ₹875.55 crore, against profits of ₹310.01 crore. Why it matters: So unlike Surya Nepal (KYC #01), which paid out 95 percent of its profit, Dabur Nepal appears to have paid out nothing. The reserves grew; so did the unpaid bill from the owner.
In December 2015, 77 container trucks of Dabur Nepal goods were stopped at Birgunj. Two months earlier Dabur India had told its exchange that Nepal supply was affected. Why it matters: The Post reported that investigators found no substantial evidence of wrong dates. The episode shows the Nepali factory’s output was part of Dabur India’s Indian sales.
In 2002 the same director said Dabur chose a plant site in Siliguri because West Bengal offered a 25 percent capital subsidy and a 60 percent interest subsidy. Why it matters: Nepal was not the only place Dabur could build. The one account we have of why it still built here points to access and a treaty route, not the best incentives on offer.

09. A buyer that is also the owner, and what holds it up

Customer concentration is a risk when the customer can walk away, squeeze prices or fail to pay. Test each against what we know.

Walk away. The customer owns 97.5 percent of the company and itself buys about 99 percent of its subsidiary purchases from Nepal (goods against a goods-and-services line). It also showed in 2015 that it can shift production to India and Sri Lanka when it must. On the evidence of purchases, flat at ₹659.89 crore, it has not.^6,11

Squeeze prices. Not observable: the price basis of intra-group sales is not public. What is observable is margin. Operating margin before depreciation, interest and tax was 15.9 percent in 2024/25, above the 13 to 14 percent range of the years before 2023/24.^1,2 That is not what a squeezed supplier usually shows. It does not prove the pricing is right.

Fail to pay. The group is large: ₹13,192.57 crore of consolidated revenue.⁵ The risk here is less default than delay, and the balance owed has more than doubled for reasons the filing does not give.⁶

None of that makes concentration harmless. Growth now follows the group’s demand. And the cushion is thinner than in a diversified firm: foods are about 70 percent of revenue and the main inputs are fruit and sugar.^1,3

Domestic demand: HIGH. The rest of revenue, outside the parent’s purchases, fell 17 percent in the year to March 2026. Dabur says Nepal sees “significant drop in consumption and accelerated down-trading” and calls the outlook “challenging”. Outward migration, weak growth and stress in the cooperative sector all feed it. What would change our view: Two steady quarters of non-parent sales would lower it. The new government’s growth agenda would help only slowly, in Dabur’s own words.
One customer: MEDIUM. About two-thirds of sales go to Dabur India. If the group re-sources, volume can move; in 2015 it did, to India and Sri Lanka. Against that, goods from Nepal equal about 99 percent of what Dabur India reports buying from subsidiaries. What would change our view: A multi-year supply agreement, or capacity the group adds elsewhere, would change this.
The receivable from the owner: MEDIUM. Rs 400 crore owed at March 2026, 138 days of purchases against 62. It is less a credit risk than a signal: whether the owner is paying later or timing explains it is not disclosed. What would change our view: The March 2027 year-end balance will show.
Foods and raw materials: MEDIUM. Foods are about 70 percent of revenue. Pulp and concentrate prices swing with crops, and Nepal has taxed or banned sugar imports before (duty from 30 to 40 percent; a ban from October 2018 to July 2019). What would change our view: A stable sugar policy or lower concentrate prices.
Cross-border rules: MEDIUM. Exports to India depend on treaty and tax treatment. Border closures hurt in 2015. After India introduced GST in 2017, customs data showed Nepal’s recorded juice exports to India down 83.7 percent in five months; Dabur Nepal’s own income that year was flat, so the figures do not match. India cut GST on juices to 5 percent in September 2025; the effect on Nepal’s shipments is not published. What would change our view: Published data on shipments after the 2025 GST cut.
Competition: MEDIUM. The rating agency cites “increased competition in the juice and beverage segment” and importers of global brands in most categories. Unilever’s Nepal unit blamed grey-market imports after India’s GST changes for part of its own Q1 fall. What would change our view: Market-share data, which does not exist publicly.
Quality scrutiny: LOW. Anti-graft inquiries in 2010 and 2015 into date labels. In 2015 the Post reported no substantial evidence; the 2010 outcome was not found. The company denied wrongdoing both times. What would change our view: A final finding in either case.

Against those risks, what does the company have going for it? Five things, each with the evidence and its weak spot. No scores: nobody publishes the data to score them fairly.

Brand. The rating agency calls Real, Dabur and Hajmola “household names”. Dabur says its brands are “mostly market leaders” in Nepal. In 2011 its chief executive claimed more than 50 percent of juices. Weak spot: No current independent market-share figure exists. The 50 percent is fifteen years old and a company claim, and juice competition rose in 2024/25.
Distribution. More than 300 distributors serving about 1 lakh shops, and a push in 2025/26 on sales automation, new channels and digital tools. Weak spot: Some large modern-trade stores were burned in September 2025. The network also carries the domestic shortfall.
Manufacturing. A Birgunj juice plant running since the 1990s (6,000 litres an hour in 2002), now adding household care, and a herb division at Banepa. Weak spot: Capacity use is not disclosed. The 2022 expansion has no visible long-term debt behind it through 2024/25.
Balance sheet. No long-term debt, gearing 0.06 times, interest cover 48.7 times, current ratio 3.93, to mid-July 2025. Cash Rs 208 crore at mid-July 2024. CARE-NP A1+ reaffirmed in 2021, 2025 and 2026. Weak spot: The strength includes a large receivable from the owner: Rs 400 crore at March 2026.
The parent. Group research, group procedures and the Dabur brands, and a customer taking about two-thirds of sales that itself sources about 99 percent of its subsidiary purchases from Nepal. Weak spot: A captive customer is also a ceiling: growth follows the group’s demand, and the price basis of those sales is not public.

One more we can measure rather than assess: the balance sheet. At mid-July 2025: gearing 0.06 times, interest covered 48.7 times, a current ratio of 3.93 and no long-term debt. CARE reports short-term working-capital borrowing, so that is not the same as no debt. Dabur’s March 2026 summary shows only ₹16.98 crore (Rs 27 crore) of non-current liabilities, composition not given, which neither confirms nor contradicts it.^1,5 Net assets have grown from ₹565.56 crore (March 2023) to ₹875.55 crore (March 2026), and every rupee of that growth is retained profit.^5,10

Strong, then. What can’t we tell you?

10. What we could not find

Dabur Nepal is a private company. We found no separately published, full standalone financial statements for it. The analysis therefore relies on its parent’s subsidiary disclosures and related-party notes, alongside CARE Ratings Nepal’s assessments. That leaves gaps, and we would rather mark them than fill them.

Employees. No reliable count.

Segments. Foods are “around 70 percent” of revenue; there is no table.

The domestic and export split in rupees. Only the agency’s ratios and a subtraction from Dabur’s filings.

The price and margin of sales to the parent. Not disclosed.

Why the receivable rose and why the tax rate rose. Not disclosed.

Cash, capital spending and dividends. There is no cash-flow statement. The agency gives cash of Rs 208 crore at mid-July 2024 and nothing later; dividends are inferred from net assets.

The Rs 968 crore plan. Approved in 2022; we could not confirm what was built.

One conflict we could not resolve. The Himalayan Times reported that Nepal’s recorded juice exports to India fell 83.7 percent in the first five months of 2017/18, after India’s GST. The agency’s figures show Dabur Nepal’s income essentially flat that year (up 0.7 percent). Customs classification or timing probably explains it. We do not use it in the argument.^19,4,3

The article that prompted this investigation. New Business Age’s March 2026 piece could not be opened by our archiver (a bot check returned HTTP 403), so we have not cited it.²⁹

Here is how the most consequential claims were checked. The full 27-claim register, with page numbers, is in the research file.

How we checked the 15 most consequential claims

Claim	Figure	Period	Sources	Status	Note
Operating income	Rs 1,506.2 crore, down 6.8%	To mid-July 2025	¹	Partially verified	One open primary source; the brief’s news lead (New Business Age) was blocked.
Exports to Dabur India	~64% of gross revenue; almost all exports	2024/25	^1,9	Verified	Dabur’s report says “around 65%”.
Ownership	97.5% via Dabur International	2021 to 2026	^1,5,17	Verified	Rating agency and Dabur’s accounts agree.
The 2.5% holder	Rukma Shumsher Rana / Ishori Rana	2022	^17,18,3	Disputed	Two outlets, two names. Not named on this page.
Parent’s purchases	₹659.89 crore vs ₹658.70 crore	Years to Mar 2026 and 2025	^6,9	Verified	Cross-checks to the agency’s export estimate within 2.4%.
Revenue and profit	₹947.60 crore (-5.8%); ₹81.10 crore (-27.4%)	Year to Mar 2026	^5,27	Verified	Nepali press repeats the filing.
Balance owed by parent	₹250.27 crore vs ₹112.73 crore	31 March 2026 and 2025	^6,9	Verified	Figure verified. Cause UNKNOWN.
Exports, 2023/24	Rs 1,098.5 crore; 7.21% of Nepal’s exports	To mid-July 2024	^2,21	Verified	The share implies Nepal exports of Rs 15,240 crore, matching Customs.
Exports, 2024/25	About Rs 1,029 crore (3.71% × Rs 27,730 crore)	To mid-July 2025	^1,21,22	Partially verified	Derived from two sources on different bases.
Export share in 2002	92% of products	2002	^30,31	Partially verified	A director’s statement; the press brief agrees “most”.
Nepal’s share of Dabur’s juice	70 to 75%	2015	^13,11	Partially verified	One newspaper’s figure; the dependence itself is in Dabur’s filing.
No dividend	Net assets rose by exactly the profit	Years to Mar 2024 to 2026	^5,9,10	Partially verified	Inferred from the notes; AOC-1 shows no proposed dividend.
Group weight	4.23% of group profit, 7.35% of net assets	Year to Mar 2026	⁵	Verified	Dabur’s own Schedule III table.
The Rs 968 crore expansion	Approved February 2022; progress unknown	2022	^17,18,1	Verified	Approval verified. What was built is UNKNOWN.
New Business Age article	Not read	13 Mar 2026	²⁹	Not available	Refused our archiver (HTTP 403). Not cited.

With the gaps marked, what does the story say about the bigger picture?

11. What a Nepali factory with a foreign customer teaches

Strip away the brand names and the picture is a plain industrial arrangement: a factory in Nepal, a customer that is also the owner, a Nepali shelf that is the smaller part of the business, and a balance sheet that has not borrowed long-term in any year we could see.

That arrangement did real things for Nepal. The Inland Revenue Department named Dabur Nepal top taxpayer in the export of goods for 2024/25, without publishing the amount.²⁸ Its income-tax provision was Rs 49 crore in the year to March 2026.⁵ It has added Rs 330 crore to reserves in two years and grows seedlings in nurseries at altitudes from 90 to 3,500 metres.^5,7

It also did something less visible. The part of the company that faces Nepali shoppers is smaller than the part that faces its owner, and in the latest year it was the part that suffered. That is what multinational manufacturing in a small, open economy can look like: output tied to a group’s demand, jobs and taxes that stay, and a consumer franchise that carries the local economy’s weather.

We started with a working thesis: “a Nepal-based manufacturing and export business deeply integrated into its Indian parent, with export and customer concentration and a recent decline in revenue”. It holds, with two corrections. The decline is in the Nepali market, not in exports to the parent. And the integration is two-way.

Five lessons follow from that picture.

Read the denominator. Dabur Nepal’s share of Nepal’s exports fell from 7.21 percent to 3.71 percent while its own exports fell by about 6 percent. Nepal’s total exports rose 82 percent, and a year later edible oils, mostly imported crude, processed and re-exported, were 46 percent of them.^1,2,21,23,24 A share can halve without the company changing.
A captive customer steadies a bad year and caps a good one. In the year to March 2026 the parent’s purchases were flat while the rest of revenue, a proxy for the Nepali business, fell 17 percent. The same relationship ties growth to the group’s demand and to prices nobody outside can see. (Our reading.)
Retained profit is only as good as what it is held in. No dividend appears in three years, so reserves rose Rs 330 crore in two. Over the same period the balance owed by the owner went from Rs 171 crore to Rs 400 crore. How much of the retained profit is cash is not disclosed.
Two year-ends make two stories. Nepal’s statutory year ends in mid-July and the group’s in March. Compare the rating agency’s decline with Dabur’s without noticing and you will get the wrong answer in either direction.
Why public disclosure matters for a major exporter. Dabur Nepal is honoured by the tax authority as a leading exporter, yet we found no separately published, full financial statements for it. The best view comes from its owner’s subsidiary disclosures, related-party notes and a rating agency: enough to see the shape, not the detail. (Our view.)

12. So, what did we learn?

About two-thirds of Dabur Nepal’s sales go to its owner, and its goods equal about 99 percent of what Dabur India reports buying from all its subsidiaries.
In its worst recent year Dabur India’s purchases held, and the rest of revenue, mostly Nepal’s own shelf, fell 17 percent.
Profit fell faster than revenue, and the year-end balance owed by the owner more than doubled. The filings do not say why.
The balance sheet looks sturdy: no long-term debt reported through mid-July 2025, a top short-term rating, reserves up Rs 330 crore in two years.
Almost everything we know comes from a rating agency and the owner’s disclosures. A major exporter could publish full accounts of its own.

The shelf is what Nepal sees. The customer is what keeps the lines running. Here, the customer is the owner.

When two-thirds of a Nepali factory’s sales go to its owner, what should the public expect to see in its accounts?

Which Nepali company with a famous brand deserves a KYC next?

Sources & further reading

Checked 10 October 2026. Educational research, not investment advice.