KYC #06

Kumari Bank: A bank built by mergers. A record profit built on provisions.

Kumari Bank opened in 2001 with Rs 35 crore and absorbed six institutions in three deals; its paid-up capital is now Rs 2,622.6 crore. For the year to mid-July 2026 it reported a record profit of Rs 736.3 crore, and 95% of the rise in pre-tax profit is a swing in loan-loss provisions. We followed the mergers, the board, the dividends and every legal matter we could find.

The short version

A bank built by absorbing others. Kumari opened in April 2001 with Rs 35 crore. In 2017, 2020 and 2023 it absorbed six institutions; paid-up capital is Rs 2,622.6 crore, 8 times its 2016 level. In 2016 its shareholders cancelled a merger with NCC Bank at 1:1, then agreed the same ratio in 2022.^11,8,24
The merger bill was paid by the shareholders. Audited profit fell from Rs 258.0 crore to Rs 51.8 crore, Rs 0.46 crore and Rs 182.0 crore; no dividend for three years; distributable profit reached minus Rs 537 crore; ICRA rated the bank BB+.^8,6,1,21
Last year’s record profit is mostly provisions. Profit was Rs 736.3 crore, four times the year before. 95% of the rise in pre-tax profit is the swing from a loan-loss charge to a release, in a year when non-performing assets rose 32%.^1,5
Two NPL figures. 7.46% in the unaudited quarterly ratios, 8.83% in the notes to the audited accounts and the directors’ report. The first dividend in four years is 2.1053%, Rs 55.21 crore, not 21.053%.^4,1,2
Cases. The Supreme Court (2008) upheld NRB’s power over the founders’ expenses; a 2021 loan on forged land papers led to arrests, and one outlet reports eight private individuals, none of them bank staff, sentenced in 2024, with no finding against the bank found; NRB has fined and warned the bank; some 2026 allegations are single-source and are labelled as such.^18,41,42,51

The question: Kumari Bank absorbed six institutions and reported a record profit of Rs 736 crore. How much of that profit is the bank, how much is provisioning, and what did the shareholders get along the way?

The numbers

Net profit, year to mid-July 2026: Rs 736.3 crore. Audited, bank only; up 305% from Rs 182.0 crore. The unaudited statement showed Rs 738.7 crore; audit took about Rs 2.5 crore off.
Share of the rise in pre-tax profit from the provision swing: 95%. Rs 484.1 crore of the Rs 507.5 crore rise in pre-tax profit: a Rs 345.1 crore charge became a Rs 138.9 crore release. Our arithmetic on the audited income statements. After the Rs 64.4 crore rise in loan write-offs booked below the operating line, the swing in total credit cost is Rs 419.7 crore, 83% of the rise.
Gross NPL ratio, audited notes and directors’ report: 8.83%. Non-performing assets of Rs 2,669.5 crore, up 32% on a year. The unaudited quarterly ratio for the same date is 7.46%.
Institutions absorbed since 2017: 6 in three deals. Four in 2017, Deva Bikas in 2020, NCC Bank in 2023. Paid-up capital: Rs 326.6 crore in mid-July 2016, Rs 2,622.6 crore now, 8.0 times.
Years without a dividend: 3 (years to mid-July 2023, 2024, 2025). The reason in each report: negative distributable profit, minus Rs 220 crore, Rs 537 crore and Rs 385 crore at the three year-ends. The year to mid-July 2026 pays 2.1053%, Rs 55.21 crore.
Book value per share, mid-July 2026: Rs 170.71. Bank’s own figure (audited equity Rs 4,476.9 crore over 26.2259 crore shares). It was Rs 142.76 in mid-July 2022, Rs 132.71 in 2024 and Rs 141.53 in 2025. Rs 138.9 crore of the latest year’s profit is a provision release.

01. A bank built by mergers. A record profit built on provisions.

Kumari Bank opened on 3 April 2001 with Rs 35 crore of capital. In three deals (2017, 2020 and 2023) it absorbed six institutions, and its paid-up capital is now Rs 2,622.6 crore, 8.0 times what it was in 2016.^14,8,1,11

For the year to mid-July 2026 it reported a record profit of Rs 736.3 crore, four times the year before. But pre-tax profit rose Rs 507.5 crore, and Rs 484.1 crore of that is one line: a Rs 345.1 crore loan-loss charge in the year to mid-July 2025 became a Rs 138.9 crore release.^1,5

Put another way, 95.4% of the rise in pre-tax profit is provisioning. The same year, non-performing assets rose 32% to Rs 2,669.5 crore in the audited notes. That is not an accusation: provisions can be released legitimately when the loans behind them recover or the estimates change. It means the profit tells you about the provisioning more than about the bank’s earning power.^1,5

There is one more fact a reader should have before the detail. The bank’s own documents give two NPL ratios for 16 July 2026: 8.83% in the notes to the audited accounts (repeated in the directors’ report) and 7.46% in the unaudited quarterly ratios, Rs 414.7 crore apart. We show both and say which is which.^1,4

This is a Know Your Company file, not a valuation. It says what Kumari Bank is, how it was assembled, who runs it, what its profit is made of and what the courts and regulator have found, and it gives no price target. Our valuation of 14 October 2026 asks what the price assumes; this file is the foundation for that question.⁵⁶

Kumari Bank absorbed six institutions and reported a record profit of Rs 736 crore. How much of that profit is the bank, how much is provisioning, and what did the shareholders get along the way?

02. Kumari Bank on one page

The facts a shareholder should be able to repeat from memory. The last column says whether each is established by a filing, differs between sources, or is our arithmetic.

Item	What the sources show	Label
Company	Kumari Bank Limited, NEPSE: KBL. Class A commercial bank; head office at Tangal, Kathmandu.	Established
Incorporated; opened	10 December 1999 (24 Mangsir 2056) in the bank’s notes; banking began 3 April 2001 (21 Chaitra 2057). The 25th annual report merges the two dates.	Sources differ
Paid-up capital	Rs 2,622.59 crore: 26.2259 crore shares of Rs 100, unchanged since the NCC merger in January 2023.	Established
Owners	Promoters 51%, public 49% at mid-July 2026. Holders above 1%: Employees Provident Fund 3.19%, the chair himself 2.02%, Citizen Investment Trust 1.88%, and three others at 1.17% to 1.30%. The full promoter register is not published.	Established; register not seen
Size, 16 July 2026	Gross loans, advances and overdrafts Rs 30,238.5 crore (net Rs 28,618 crore on the audited balance sheet); deposits Rs 40,273.6 crore; equity Rs 4,476.9 crore (audited, bank only).	Established
Profit, year to mid-July 2026	Rs 736.3 crore audited (unaudited Rs 738.7 crore). Profit available for distribution Rs 63.5 crore (unaudited Rs 79.2 crore).	Established
Gross NPL, 16 July 2026	8.83% in the directors’ report; 7.46% in the unaudited quarterly ratios and Basel disclosure.	Sources differ
Capital	Capital fund 13.50% (audited notes, directors’ report) or 13.55% (Basel, unaudited); Tier 1 9.87% audited, 9.92% unaudited.	Established
Network	279 branches, 295 ATMs and 41 extension counters at 16 September 2026 (302 branches in July 2025); the same book’s KPI table shows 326 branches and 336 ATMs at 16 July 2026, which we cannot reconcile. 2,946 staff.	Established
Subsidiaries	Kumari Capital Limited and K.B.L. Securities Limited, both 100% owned; investments Rs 40 crore and Rs 20 crore.	Established
Chair; chief executive	Amir Pratap J.B. Rana; Ram Chandra Khanal (since 17 November 2023).	Established
Latest dividend	2.1053% cash, tax included (Rs 55.21 crore), passed 14 October 2026. NRB approval and payment date: not found.	Established; payment not seen
Rating	ICRA Nepal: issuer BB+ (January and September 2025; BB+ in an August 2026 transition table).	Established (ICRA); 2026 table reported
Auditors	Joint audit by GP Rajbahak and NBSM; reappointed for the year to mid-July 2027 at Rs 46.46 lakh.	Established
Legal record	10 matters registered: two concluded, two imposed (NRB sanctions), three pending or in review, three unresolved. Apart from the 2008 ruling against the founding chairman’s petition, no court has found against the bank or its directors in any of them. Cases are labelled by their exact legal status.	Our register
Research cut-off	19 October 2026; the legal matters were checked on 18 October 2026.

Sources: ^{1,2,4,22,5,15}. Bank only unless stated. Rs figures are Nepali rupees in crore.

A bank that opened with Rs 35 crore in 2001 and has Rs 2,622.6 crore today. How did it start?

03. A fifteenth bank with a technology story

The first annual report says the promoters began work in 1995/96 (2052 BS). The bank’s notes give its incorporation as 10 December 1999 (24 Mangsir 2056) and banking began on 3 April 2001 (21 Chaitra 2057).^14,9 NRB’s list of commercial banks counts it fifteenth, which is why Kumari calls itself the fifteenth commercial bank.¹⁷ Paid-up capital at opening was Rs 35 crore.

The two dates are often confused. The 25th annual report prints the opening date (21 Chaitra 2057) as the date of incorporation; six other reports print 10 December 1999.^5,9 Registered in 1999, opened in 2001. We have not seen the Company Registrar’s record, so the 1999 date rests on the bank’s own notes.

In October 2000 Nepali Times reported a dispute among the directors that had gone to court before the planned opening.³⁴ We found nothing more on how it ended. In the first annual report the founding chairman, Noor Pratap J.B. Rana, lists six other directors; five directors took leave in that first year.¹⁴

The bank moved quickly on technology. NRB’s Bank Supervision Report says Kumari was the first bank in Nepal to introduce internet banking, in 2002; a 2004 Nepali Times article and the bank’s reports fit the year.^16,36 An IPO of Rs 15 crore (15 lakh shares at Rs 100) closed within a week in December 2003 to January 2004, with 103,493 applications for 8.01 times the shares on offer. Paid-up capital rose to Rs 50 crore, and deposits were Rs 480 crore at mid-July 2004.^35,12

The bank was small, fast-growing and run by its founders, in a market with a dozen incumbents. Early frictions with the regulator were also part of that story, and chapter 9 begins with the Supreme Court’s 2008 judgment on the founders’ pre-opening expenses.

A technology-led start. What happened over the next two decades?

04. From one bank to a merger machine

The record below is dated and sourced. Where a date is disputed the card says so, and where we found only one report the card says that too.

1995 to 1999: Promoters start; the company is registered. The first annual report says the promoters’ effort began in 2052 BS (1995/96). The bank’s own notes give the date of incorporation as 10 December 1999 (24 Mangsir 2056). We found no Company Registrar record, so the date rests on the bank’s notes. The 25th annual report gives 21 Chaitra 2057 (3 April 2001) as the date of incorporation, which is the opening date.
Oct 2000: A boardroom dispute before opening. Nepali Times reported the planned December 2000 start and a dispute among the directors that had gone to court. The bank did not open until April 2001. We found nothing more on how it was settled.
3 Apr 2001: Banking begins (21 Chaitra 2057 BS). The first annual report says the bank began business on this date and ran for 3 months 11 days of its first year. NRB’s list of commercial banks gives the same date and counts Kumari fifteenth, which is why the bank calls itself the fifteenth commercial bank. Paid-up capital was Rs 35 crore.
2002: Internet banking. NRB’s Bank Supervision Report says Kumari was the first bank in Nepal to introduce internet banking, in 2002. The bank’s own 2002 and 2003 reports and a 2004 Nepali Times article fit 2002. The regulator’s sentence repeats across editions, so this is one source repeated plus one article: “introduced in 2002” is well supported, “first” is the regulator’s word.
Dec 2003 to Jan 2004: Initial public offering, Rs 15 crore. 15 lakh shares at Rs 100. The issue closed within a week, with 103,493 applications and 8.01 times the shares applied for. Paid-up capital rose from Rs 35 crore to Rs 50 crore.
2 Jan 2008: The Supreme Court rules on the founders’ pre-opening expenses. The court dismisses the founding chairman’s writ against an NRB directive over Rs 1.50 crore (Rs 15,031,705) of pre-operating expenses without supporting bills. Chapter 4 has the details.
13 Jan 2016: Six-way merger agreed in principle. Kumari, NCC Bank and four development banks sign an agreement to merge (29 Poush 2072). Due-diligence swap ratios: NCC 100, Kumari 100, Infrastructure 77, Supreme 77, International 73, Apex 48.
15 Jul 2016: Kumari’s shareholders cancel it. A special general meeting discards the merger. The reasons given: stakeholders were not satisfied with the swap ratio, and the bank would struggle to pay a return to shareholders for some years. NRB approved the discard on 27 September 2016. The other five went ahead without Kumari as NCC Bank from 1 January 2017.
16 Asadh 2074 (30 Jun 2017): Four smaller institutions are absorbed. Kasthamandap Development Bank, Paschimanchal Finance, Mahakali Bikas Bank and Kankrebihar Bikas Bank, at 85 Kumari shares for every 100 of theirs (agreed 25 Jan 2017). Paid-up capital: Rs 596.9 crore. The bank’s notes say the purpose was to meet NRB’s capital directive.
12 Jul 2020: Deva Bikas Bank is absorbed. Agreement 15 January 2020; swap 86 Kumari shares for 100 of Deva Bikas; joint operation from 28 Asadh 2077. Paid-up capital: Rs 1,252.0 crore. Goodwill of Rs 8.88 crore.
Mid-2021, reported Oct to Nov 2021: Police say a loan was obtained on forged land papers. Police say a loan of about Rs 19 crore was obtained at the New Road branch against forged ownership papers for a singer’s land in Bara. The loan is reported to date from around June to July 2021; arrests follow in late October and November 2021. Chapter 11 sets out what is and is not established.
15 Jul 2021 to 27 Apr 2022: A new chief executive. Surendra Bhandari, chief executive from June 2017 and earlier in the 2000s, retires on 15 July 2021 (31 Asadh 2078). An acting chief executive serves until February 2022 and Ram Chandra Khanal takes over, acting from 7 February and appointed on 27 April 2022, reportedly for four years.
26 Sep 2022: Merger with NCC Bank agreed at 1:1. One Kumari share for each NCC share, the same ratio as the 2016 plan between these two banks. Both banks’ shareholders approve on 11 December 2022; NRB gives final approval on 21 December.
1 Jan 2023: NCC Bank’s branches become Kumari’s. Joint operation from 17 Poush 2079. NCC’s accounts run to 16 Poush 2079 (31 December 2022). Paid-up capital: Rs 2,622.6 crore. Goodwill Rs 2.03 crore.
Year to mid-July 2023: Bigger bank, smaller profit. Audited profit falls from Rs 258.0 crore to Rs 51.8 crore. No dividend is proposed from here until 2026.
17 Nov 2023: Khanal becomes chief executive again. The former NCC chief executive, who ran the merged bank from 1 January 2023, has his resignation accepted on 16 November 2023, and Khanal returns the next day. We did not find the length of this second term.
11 Feb 2024: The present board is elected. Six directors are elected, and an independent director was nominated by the board on 27 December 2023: seven non-executive directors in all. The board has not changed since.
4 Dec 2024: Supreme Court order on NRB warnings. The court dismisses a writ seeking the removal of the chief executives and boards of NRB and nine banks, Kumari among them, and says an NRB sanction, even a warning, makes a director or chief executive ineligible for five years. It does not say what sanction Kumari received.
Year to mid-July 2024: Profit of Rs 0.46 crore. The unaudited statement had shown Rs 230.8 crore. Audit took Rs 230.4 crore off it.
27 Jan 2025: ICRA cuts the bank to BB+. The rating agency cites the industry’s highest gross NPA, tier-I capital below the regulatory minimum and “significant deviation” between unaudited and audited figures. The watch is removed on 25 September 2025; the rating stays BB+.
16 Jul 2026: Year-end: record profit, higher NPA. Audited profit Rs 736.3 crore. Non-performing assets Rs 2,669.5 crore, up 32%. The unaudited quarterly ratios show an NPL ratio of 7.46%, the directors’ report 8.83%.
14 Oct 2026: First dividend in four years. The 26th annual meeting passes a cash dividend of 2.1053% of paid-up capital, including tax: Rs 55.21 crore. The last dividend was 12.5% cash for the year to mid-July 2022.

Six turning points, with the evidence

2001 to 2004: A new bank with a technology story. What happened: Kumari opens in April 2001 with Rs 35 crore, brings in internet banking and SWIFT in 2002, and raises Rs 15 crore in an IPO that is 8 times subscribed. Why it mattered: Fifteenth commercial bank in a market with a dozen incumbents; it competed on service and technology. What changed: By mid-July 2004 deposits were Rs 480 crore. The long-term consequence: Small, fast-growing, and run by its founders. The first annual report lists the founding chairman and six directors; five earlier directors had taken leave in that first year and four of the six replaced them.
2008: The founders meet the regulator’s expense rules. What happened: The Supreme Court holds that NRB may control a bank’s expenses and that a general meeting cannot override that; expenses with no bills cannot be recognised because the board approved them. Why it mattered: The case came from Rs 1.50 crore (Rs 15,031,705) of pre-opening expenses spent between 2057 and 2061 BS. What changed: It is one of the earliest rulings on NRB’s power over a bank’s own spending. The long-term consequence: It is a finding about expense documentation in the bank’s first years, 18 years ago. It is not a finding about the bank today.
2016 to 2017: The merger Kumari refused, and the four it took. What happened: Kumari’s shareholders cancel a six-way merger in July 2016. Eleven months later Kumari absorbs four smaller institutions at 100:85. Why it mattered: NRB had told commercial banks to reach Rs 800 crore of paid-up capital by mid-July 2017. What changed: Paid-up capital rose from Rs 326.6 crore to Rs 596.9 crore in one year, still short of Rs 800 crore; it reached Rs 868.6 crore only in mid-July 2019, after rights and bonus shares. The long-term consequence: The acquisition added Rs 135.4 crore of the Rs 473 crore gap to the capital rule; rights issues and bonus shares supplied the rest. It also started the pattern of growing by taking over.
2020 and 2023: Deva Bikas, then NCC Bank. What happened: Deva Bikas joins in July 2020 at 100:86; NCC Bank in January 2023 at 1:1. Why it mattered: The bank issued 11.51 crore new shares of Rs 100 (Rs 1,151.5 crore) to NCC’s holders, 43.9% of the merged capital. What changed: Paid-up capital rose 78% to Rs 2,622.6 crore and assets 79% to Rs 38,052 crore. The long-term consequence: At the end of the first merged year the bank was nearly twice the size and earned a fifth of the profit (Rs 51.8 crore against Rs 258.0 crore).
2023 to 2025: The bill for the merger. What happened: Audited profit: Rs 51.8 crore, Rs 0.46 crore, Rs 182.0 crore in three years. No dividend. Distributable profit negative, at minus Rs 537 crore by mid-July 2024. Why it mattered: Rs 240 crore of accumulated loss and interest suspense came across from NCC Bank; the first merged year was the one in which the bank paid for it. What changed: ICRA cut the rating to BB+; gross NPL rose from 1.11% (2022) to 6.95% (2025). The long-term consequence: Per-share book value fell from Rs 142.76 to Rs 132.71 before recovering. The shareholders carried the integration cost.
2026: A record profit and two NPL figures. What happened: Profit of Rs 736.3 crore, four times the year before. Rs 484.1 crore of the Rs 507.5 crore rise in pre-tax profit is the swing from a loan-loss charge to a reversal. Why it mattered: The bank released provisions in a year when its non-performing assets rose by a third. What changed: The first dividend in four years, 2.1053%, is possible because profit available for distribution turned positive. The long-term consequence: Whether the profit repeats depends on whether the provisions held are enough for the NPA. The notes and directors’ report give the figures; the audited stage tables are not in the English notes we read.

The thread is that Kumari has been defined less by how it grew from within than by what it absorbed. After 2016 every large step in its size was a merger, and the one merger shareholders refused, in 2016, they accepted six years later on the same terms.

Six institutions in three deals. What exactly did Kumari buy, and on what terms?

05. One refused merger, three accepted ones

Here is every deal, including the one that did not happen. The table gives the terms exactly as the bank’s filings record them, with the press where the filings are silent.

Deal	Dates	Swap ratio	Paid-up capital after	Accounting
Six-way merger with NCC Bank and four development banks (cancelled)	Agreed 13 Jan 2016; cancelled by Kumari’s SGM 15 Jul 2016; NRB approved the discard 27 Sep 2016	NCC 100, Kumari 100, Infrastructure 77, Supreme 77, International 73, Apex 48	n/a	Proposal only
Kasthamandap Development Bank, Paschimanchal Finance, Mahakali Bikas Bank, Kankrebihar Bikas Bank	Ratio agreed 25 Jan 2017; joint operation 30 Jun 2017 (16 Asadh 2074)	85 Kumari shares per 100 of each	Rs 596.9 crore (audited addition Rs 135.4 crore; news said Rs 164 crore)	Interest pooling; no goodwill
Deva Bikas Bank	Agreement 15 Jan 2020; SGM 1 Jun 2020; joint operation 12 Jul 2020	86 Kumari shares per 100 of Deva	Rs 1,252.0 crore	Acquisition method; goodwill Rs 8.88 crore
NCC Bank (Nepal Credit and Commerce Bank)	MoU 26 Sep 2022; SGMs 11 Dec 2022; NRB final approval 21 Dec 2022; joint operation 1 Jan 2023	1 : 1	Rs 2,622.6 crore (the Rs 1,151.5 crore of shares issued to NCC’s holders are 43.9% of it)	Acquisition method; goodwill Rs 2.03 crore (consideration Rs 1,526.7 crore against business value Rs 1,524.7 crore)

Sources: ^{11,10,8,28,31,25,26,32}. NRB, NEPSE and registrar notices for these deals were not found; the NRB approval dates for the 2017 and 2020 deals are from ShareSansar only. No valuation reports were found.

The 2016 plan was the biggest: Kumari, NCC Bank and four development banks, each with a due-diligence swap weight (NCC 100, Kumari 100, Infrastructure 77, Supreme 77, International 73, Apex 48). Kumari’s special general meeting cancelled it on 15 July 2016; the other five formed NCC Bank from 1 January 2017.^11,29,30 Within a year of the cancellation Kumari absorbed four smaller institutions on its own, at 85 of its shares for 100 of theirs. The bank’s notes say the purpose was to meet NRB’s capital directive; NRB had asked commercial banks for Rs 800 crore by mid-July 2017, and Kumari reached Rs 868.6 crore only in mid-July 2019.^10,7,32

Deva Bikas Bank followed in July 2020 at 86 for 100, with goodwill of Rs 8.88 crore. NCC Bank joined on 1 January 2023 at 1 : 1, creating goodwill of only Rs 2.03 crore (consideration Rs 1,526.7 crore against a business value of Rs 1,524.7 crore). NCC’s former shareholders now hold 43.9% of the shares, and NCC arrived with a Rs 240 crore accumulated loss on its books and interest in suspense.^31,8 The merged bank was nearly twice the size and earned a fifth of the profit.

In January 2016 the plan was to merge Kumari and NCC at 100 to 100. Kumari’s shareholders cancelled it. In 2022 they approved it at 1 to 1. Why it matters: Same ratio, six years apart. In between, Kumari absorbed five other institutions and NCC absorbed four. We do not know why the ratio was acceptable the second time; the filings do not say, and the 2022 appraiser is not named.
95% of the rise in pre-tax profit last year is the swing in loan-loss provisions. Why it matters: Pre-tax profit rose Rs 507.5 crore, from Rs 523.5 crore to Rs 1,030.9 crore. The impairment line went from a charge of Rs 345.1 crore to a release of Rs 138.9 crore: Rs 484.1 crore.
The “21.053%” dividend appears to be a web address. Why it matters: One news site’s link reads “21053”, with the decimal point removed; we found no report that prints 21.053%. The article itself, the bank’s notice and the signed minute say 2.1053%, which is Rs 55.21 crore. 21.053% would be Rs 552 crore, nearly nine times the profit available for distribution.
Two documents give two NPL figures for the same day, 16 July 2026. Why it matters: The unaudited ratio table says 7.46% (Rs 2,254.8 crore). The notes to the audited accounts, repeated in the directors’ report, say 8.83% (Rs 2,669.5 crore). The difference, Rs 414.7 crore, is mostly loans classed as loss.
The bank’s own annual reports give two dates for one merger. Why it matters: Joint operation with NCC Bank began on 1 January 2023 (17 Poush 2079). One note in a January 2025 file says 2024; the same report’s CEO note and the April 2026 re-issue say 2023.

Merger accounting is where cost shows up late. The first merged year earned Rs 51.8 crore on Rs 38,052 crore of assets, the next Rs 0.46 crore, and distributable profit stayed negative, at minus Rs 220 crore, Rs 537 crore and Rs 385 crore at three year-ends. A merger can be right for the franchise and still be paid for by the shareholders in the years after; this one was.^8,6,5

Who decided all this, and who holds the shares?

06. A promoter group of 51%, a board that has not changed since 2024

Promoters hold 51% and the public 49%. The largest named holder is the Employees Provident Fund with 3.19%; the chair, Amir Pratap J.B. Rana, holds 2.02% and Citizen Investment Trust 1.88%. Three more holders each have between 1.17% and 1.30%. No holder has control: the promoter group’s influence runs through the board.¹ ICRA Nepal made the same point in 2019, noting the lack of strong institutional promoters behind a 51 : 49 promoter-to-public split.²⁰

Name	Seat	Status
Amir Pratap J.B. Rana	Chairperson; promoter group	Elected 11 Feb 2024; chair in the reports since the year to mid-July 2019
Pashupati Murarka	Promoter group	Elected 11 Feb 2024
Vijay Kumar Shrestha	Promoter group; represents the Employees Provident Fund	Elected 11 Feb 2024
Mahesh Prasad Pokharel	General public	Elected 11 Feb 2024
Rajaram Khadka	General public	Elected 11 Feb 2024
Simran Agrawal	General public (women’s seat)	Elected 11 Feb 2024
Vijay Sthapit	Independent director	Nominated by the board 27 Dec 2023; no shares

Sources: ^1,2,6. All seven are non-executive. There was no board election at the 26th meeting; why four directors left in February 2024 is not stated in the documents we read.

The board has seven non-executive directors, elected on 11 February 2024 at the 23rd annual meeting. The four directors who sat before it left then; the documents we read do not say why. The 26th meeting in October 2026 had no board election.^1,2,6

Amir Pratap J.B. Rana (Chairperson; promoter-group director). A director in the first annual report (year to mid-July 2001) and chair in the report for the year to mid-July 2019 and since. Chairs a seven-member board of non-executive directors elected on 11 February 2024; the board has not changed since. Three directors represent the promoter group (one of them the Employees Provident Fund), three the general public (one a woman director) and one is independent. The present board, elected in February 2024, has sat through the near-zero profit of 2024, the rating cut and the record profit of 2026. It is a board with a long-serving chair, who is himself the second-largest named holder (2.02%) after the Employees Provident Fund (3.19%). The filings show no controlling individual: the promoter group holds 51%.
Ram Chandra Khanal (Chief Executive Officer). Acting chief executive from 7 February 2022, appointed 27 April 2022 (reported as a four-year term), replaced by NCC’s former chief executive on the merger date (1 January 2023), and chief executive again from 17 November 2023, term not found. He was among the respondents in a writ about NRB warnings that the Supreme Court dismissed in December 2024. The court did not say which sanction, if any, applied to him. A headline said the court “disqualified” bank chief executives. The order does not say that and no court has ordered his removal. NRB’s spokesperson says officials are not automatically disqualified, and the bank and he have not been reported to have commented.
GP Rajbahak & Co. and NBSM & Co. (Joint statutory auditors from the year to mid-July 2025). Joshi & Bhandary audited to the year ending mid-July 2024. The two firms have audited jointly since. All three reports in our set are unmodified opinions; the 24th report carries an emphasis-of-matter paragraph; the next two list four key audit matters each. The 26th meeting appointed the joint auditors again for Rs 46.46 lakh. Audit lowered the unaudited profit by Rs 230.4 crore for the year to mid-July 2024 (under the earlier auditor) and by about Rs 2.5 crore for the year to mid-July 2026. An unmodified opinion says the statements follow the standards; it does not tell you the loan book is sound. The 2024 change shows audit can move the number.
Noor Pratap J.B. Rana (Founding chairman (2000 to 2005 or later)). Chaired the bank when it opened and held the largest block (6.50%) in 2005. The petitioner in the 2008 Supreme Court case on pre-opening expenses. The Supreme Court dismissed his writ. The 22nd annual report’s chairman’s message, signed by the present chair, calls him “my father, the late Mr. Noor Pratap JB Rana”. Founder and chair share a family name and, by that report, a family.

Item	What the sources show
Chief executive, year to mid-July 2026	Pay Rs 1.90 crore. The pay tables are headed “in thousands” but print rupees.
Senior management, year to mid-July 2026	Rs 38.46 crore in total; directors’ fees and benefits Rs 55.4 lakh.
Loans to directors, senior staff and families	Rs 8.45 crore of loans and Rs 5.54 crore of deposits, in aggregate only.
Deputy chief executive	Sudhir Nath Pandey (our reading of the management page; the “deputy chief executive after the merger” label for Khanal in some reports is not verified).

Sources: ^1,15. Individual related-party balances are not itemised in the notes we read.

Chief executive turnover is a pattern worth noting. Kumari had Surendra Bhandari until July 2021, an acting chief executive for about seven months, Ram Chandra Khanal from February 2022, NCC’s former chief executive from the merger date in January 2023, and Khanal again from 17 November 2023. Four changes of hand in just over two years, around a merger.^33,8,6

Why this matters. The people matter because the present board (since February 2024) and chief executive signed the near-zero profit of 2024, accepted the rating cut, and sit on the record profit of 2026. Continuity is not a finding of anything. It means the bank’s explanations come from the same hands in each year.

We know who sits at the table. What does the bank earn, and where does the profit come from?

07. Profit, provisions and the two NPL figures

Below, the long record and then the two things that change how to read the latest year: the bridge from last year’s pre-tax profit to this year’s, and the two NPL documents.

Net profit, years to mid-July, Rs crore

Jul 16: Rs 71.61 crore
Jul 17: Rs 79.31 crore
Jul 18: Rs 104.19 crore
Jul 19: Rs 123.04 crore
Jul 20: Rs 115.85 crore
Jul 21: Rs 197.07 crore
Jul 22: Rs 257.98 crore
Jul 23: Rs 51.79 crore
Jul 24: Rs 0.46 crore
Jul 25: Rs 181.97 crore
Jul 26: Rs 736.27 crore (provisional, unaudited)

Bank only, as printed in each year’s annual report: the years to mid-July 2016 and 2017 under previous accounting standards, later years under NFRS. Profit rose to Rs 258.0 crore in the year to mid-July 2022, fell to Rs 51.8 crore and Rs 0.46 crore after the NCC merger, and reached Rs 736.3 crore in the latest year. Axis starts at zero.

Gross non-performing loan ratio, years to mid-July, %

Jul 16: Rs 1.15 crore
Jul 17: Rs 1.86 crore
Jul 18: Rs 1.05 crore
Jul 19: Rs 1.01 crore
Jul 20: Rs 1.39 crore
Jul 21: Rs 0.96 crore
Jul 22: Rs 1.11 crore
Jul 23: Rs 4.96 crore
Jul 24: Rs 5.96 crore
Jul 25: Rs 6.95 crore
Jul 26: Rs 8.83 crore (provisional, unaudited)

As reported each year. The last column is the audited note and directors’ report figure (8.83%); the unaudited quarterly ratio for the same date is 7.46%. Definitions follow NRB rules for each year, so the long run is indicative.

Paid-up capital, years to mid-July, Rs crore

Jul 16: Rs 326.60 crore
Jul 17: Rs 596.95 crore
Jul 18: Rs 716.34 crore
Jul 19: Rs 868.56 crore
Jul 20: Rs 1,252.00 crore
Jul 21: Rs 1,387.85 crore
Jul 22: Rs 1,471.12 crore
Jul 23: Rs 2,622.59 crore
Jul 24: Rs 2,622.59 crore
Jul 25: Rs 2,622.59 crore
Jul 26: Rs 2,622.59 crore (provisional, unaudited)

Bank only. The steps are the 2017 acquisition of four institutions, Deva Bikas in 2020, and NCC Bank in January 2023, with bonus and rights shares between. Capital is 8.0 times its mid-July 2016 level.

Bank only, year to mid-July	2016	2018	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Paid-up capital, Rs crore	326.6	716.3	1,252.0	1,471.1	2,622.6	2,622.6	2,622.6	2,622.6
Total assets, Rs crore	4,241.7	8,272.4	15,334.2	21,210.8	38,052.5	40,945.3	44,168.4	49,168.1
Net profit, Rs crore	71.6	104.2	115.9	258.0	51.8	0.5	182.0	736.3
Earnings per share, Rs	26.53	14.54	12.08	17.54	1.97	0.02	6.94	28.07
Gross NPL ratio	1.15%	1.05%	1.39%	1.11%	4.96%	5.96%	6.95%	8.83%
Capital fund ratio	11.69%	13.36%	15.35%	12.63%	12.11%	11.42%	12.31%	13.50%
Dividend (cash, bonus)	1.1%, 21%	0, 8.5%	3.15%, 10.85%	12.5%, 0	none	none	none	2.1053%, 0

Sources: ^1,9,8,6,5,10 and the earlier annual reports on the bank’s website. Figures are as first reported: pre-2018 under previous accounting standards, EPS before later bonus adjustments, assets for 2020 as in the 20th report (the next report restates). “2016” is the year to mid-July 2016, “2018” the year to mid-July 2018, and so on; the 2026 NPL is the directors’ report figure.

The bridge is simple. Pre-tax profit rose Rs 507.5 crore. The impairment line contributes Rs 484.1 crore. Net trading income, mostly foreign exchange, adds Rs 42.7 crore, net interest income Rs 39.2 crore and fees Rs 38.8 crore. Lower other operating costs add Rs 17.4 crore; write-offs, lower other operating income and higher staff cost take away Rs 114.6 crore.^1,5

Change in pre-tax profit, year to mid-July 2026 against 2025	Rs crore	Share of the Rs 507.5 crore rise
Loan-loss provisions: a Rs 345.1 crore charge became a Rs 138.9 crore release	+484.1	95%
Net trading income (largely foreign exchange)	+42.7	8%
Net interest income	+39.2	8%
Net fee and commission income	+38.8	8%
Other operating expenses and depreciation (lower)	+17.4	3%
Other operating income	-4.0	-1%
Non-operating items (write-offs)	-53.0	-10%
Personnel expenses (higher)	-57.6	-11%
Total change in pre-tax profit	+507.5	100%

Source: ^1,5, our arithmetic from the audited income statements (bank only). The lines add to the total. Tax fell Rs 46.8 crore as the charge dropped from 65% to 29% of pre-tax profit, partly because the earlier year included Rs 185.9 crore of tax for earlier years, which adds to the profit rise; the profit rise is Rs 554.3 crore.

Tax also helped. The effective tax rate fell from 65% to 29%, which adds Rs 46.8 crore to the profit rise, so the profit after tax rose Rs 554.3 crore, of which the provisioning swing is 87.3%.^1,5 Without that swing, pre-tax profit would have been about Rs 546.9 crore rather than Rs 1,030.9 crore (our arithmetic, before any tax effect).

Document, same date (16 July 2026)	NPL	Ratio	Status
Notes to the audited accounts (5.2.4), repeated in the directors’ report: substandard Rs 620.0 crore, doubtful Rs 252.1 crore, loss Rs 1,797.4 crore	Rs 2,669.5 crore	8.83% (net 1.99%)	Audited note, beside audited profit of Rs 736.3 crore
Basel III disclosure: substandard Rs 615.2 crore, doubtful Rs 232.9 crore, loss Rs 1,406.7 crore	Rs 2,254.8 crore	7.46% (net 1.94%)	Unaudited
Same note, a year earlier (16 July 2025)	Rs 2,031.8 crore as printed then; Rs 2,026.9 crore as restated in this year’s comparative	6.95% as printed (6.93% on the restated figure)	Audited year; the loss class was lowered by Rs 4.9 crore on restatement, with no explanation in the notes we read
Provision held against NPA (directors’ report)	Rs 2,068.8 crore	77% of NPA	Substandard Rs 154.5 crore, doubtful Rs 116.9 crore, loss Rs 1,797.4 crore

Sources: ^1,4. The difference between the two NPL figures is Rs 414.7 crore, of which Rs 390.7 crore is in the loss class. The book does not say what changed between the quarterly figure and the directors’ report. The 111.75% “provision to NPL” in the quarterly table is total provision, including provision on performing loans, so it is not comparable with the 77%.

The loan book by sector tells where the stress sits. Under the broader accounting (ECL) definition, Stage 3 loans to customers are Rs 4,796.8 crore, 16.3% of gross customer loans, and wholesale and retail trade and construction hold 48% of them (unaudited).³ The regulatory NPA of Rs 2,669 crore in the audited note is a different measure. Provisions held against it are 77%.¹

What we cannot tell. The documents do not show what moved the NPL from 7.46% in the quarterly ratios to 8.83% in the audited notes, whether the loss class was reclassified, or how the release of Rs 138.9 crore sits with a 32% rise in non-performing assets. The audited ECL stage tables are not in the English notes we read. That is the most important gap in this file.

The profit is mostly provisioning. What changed for shareholders after the merger?

08. Twice the bank, a lean three years, and a small dividend

Compare the last year before the NCC merger with the latest year, bank only.

Bank only	Mid-July 2022 (last year before the merger)	Mid-July 2026	Change
Paid-up capital, Rs crore	1,471.1	2,622.6	+78%
Total assets, Rs crore	21,210.8	49,168.1	+132%
Loans, Rs crore	15,944.4	30,238.5	+90%
Deposits, Rs crore	17,676.8	40,273.6	+128%
Net profit, Rs crore	258.0	736.3	+185%
Book value per share, Rs	142.76	170.71	+19.6%
Gross NPL ratio	1.11%	8.83%	+7.7 points
Capital fund ratio	12.63%	13.50%	+0.9 points
Employees	1,845	2,946	+60%
Cash dividend paid out of the year’s profit	12.5% (Rs 183.9 crore)	2.1053% (Rs 55.2 crore)

Sources: ^1,9,8. Book value per share is the bank’s own figure. Mid-July 2026 profit includes a Rs 138.9 crore provision release.

Year to mid-July	Bonus shares	Cash dividend	Why, where stated
Year to mid-July 2018	8.5%	none
Year to mid-July 2019	10%	0.53%
Year to mid-July 2020	10.85%	3.15%
Year to mid-July 2021	6%	2.67%
Year to mid-July 2022	none	12.5%	Rs 183.9 crore, paid in the year to mid-July 2023 (one table prints 0%; the board report and cash flow say 12.5%)
Year to mid-July 2023	none	none	Negative distributable profit after NCC’s inherited loss and the redemption reserve
Year to mid-July 2024	none	none	Distributable profit minus Rs 537 crore
Year to mid-July 2025	none	none	Distributable profit minus Rs 385 crore
Year to mid-July 2026	none	2.1053% (Rs 55.21 crore)	Distributable profit plus Rs 63.5 crore audited; Rs 2.00 a share after 5% tax, our arithmetic

Sources: ^1,2,9,8,6,5. Cash percentages are of paid-up capital and include the tax on any bonus; the 0.53% for the year to mid-July 2019 is the tax on a 10% bonus, grossed up (0.5 divided by 0.95). The NRB directive on distributable profit was not read; the three reports give negative retained earnings as the reason.

The first dividend in four years is 2.1053% of paid-up capital, tax included. It is Rs 55.21 crore, which is Rs 2.00 a share after 5% tax (our arithmetic). One news site’s web address reads “21053”, a decimal-point slip, and we found no report that prints 21.053%; that rate would be Rs 552 crore, nearly nine times the audited distributable profit, which is Rs 63.5 crore.^2,23,1

The dividend returns because distributable profit has turned positive, not because the bank earned a normal profit. Distributable profit is after setting aside reserves and recovering the accumulated loss that came with NCC. A normal year might leave less.

Here are the cases. What has been decided, and what has only been reported?

09. The legal record: ten matters, one old court ruling, no finding against today’s management

We registered every legal, regulatory or press-reported matter touching Kumari Bank that we could find in English and Nepali up to 18 October 2026, with its exact status, the date we last checked, and what each side said. Filter by status or by kind and open any entry.

10 matters, newest checked 19 October 2026.

L01 Forged land title and a Rs 19 crore loan at the New Road branch (2021). Status: Eight private individuals reported sentenced in July 2024 by one outlet; no finding against the bank found. Role: Lender; the bank is not reported as accused. Forum: Police investigation; NRB on-site inspection; Department of Money Laundering Investigation (preliminary probe reported); Special Court, Kathmandu (per one report). Allegation: Police said forged ownership papers and a forged land-office seal made 12 bigha at Bishrampur, Bara, appear to belong to others, so that it could be pledged for a loan of about Rs 19 crore at the New Road branch. Kantipur says the valuer did not verify ownership at the land office. Some November 2021 reports said police were also examining the role of senior bank officials; we found no charge against any of them. Response: A statement by the bank’s acting chief executive was reported by one outlet that we could not read; we do not rely on it. We found no other statement by the bank. Latest: Unresolved on the public record: a reported conviction of private individuals; nothing found against the bank or its directors. Imposed: Fines of Rs 3.8 crore and Rs 7.6 crore a person, per one report; claimed: Loan of about Rs 19 crore; recognised in the accounts: Not stated: the audited notes do not name this loan. Sources: ^{37,39,38,40,41} Last checked 2026-10-18.
L02 Noor Pratap J.B. Rana v. Nepal Rastra Bank: the founders’ pre-opening expenses (2008). Status: Writ dismissed by the Supreme Court on 2 Jan 2008. Role: The bank is the party whose expenses were at issue; the petitioner was its founding chairman. Forum: Supreme Court of Nepal, joint bench of Justices Anup Raj Sharma and Khil Raj Regmi. Allegation: NRB directed that Rs 1.50 crore (Rs 15,031,705) of pre-opening expenses for which no bills or receipts could be shown be repaid in cash; the petitioner sought to quash that directive. Response: The petitioner argued that the board and the general meeting had approved the spending. Latest: Concluded: a court finding in NRB’s favour about expense documentation in the bank’s first years. Imposed: None by the court; claimed: Rs 1.50 crore (Rs 15,031,705) (NRB’s directive); recognised in the accounts: Not stated. Sources: ^18,55,13 Last checked 2026-10-18.
L03 NRB fines: money-laundering accounts (2023) and credit-to-deposit ratio (2023). Status: Rs 50 lakh (February 2023) and about Rs 59 lakh (August 2023) imposed. Role: Penalised entity. Forum: NRB (administrative sanction). Allegation: First: failure to block the accounts of a person in a money-laundering case, with three other banks. Second: a credit-to-deposit shortfall in mid-January 2023. Response: None found. Latest: Imposed; no later report. Imposed: Rs 50 lakh and about Rs 59 lakh; claimed: n/a; recognised in the accounts: Not stated; immaterial against profit. Sources: ^42,43 Last checked 2026-10-18.
L04 NRB warnings and directions (2023 to 2025). Status: Four NRB releases (April 2023, May 2024, May 2025, November 2025, the last reported twice): warnings and directions; no fine on the bank. Role: Warned entity. Forum: NRB supervision (administrative). Allegation: April 2023: concessional loans to one group, inadequate loss provision, deposit rates above the published rate (the pre-merger names appear). May 2024: non-compliance in risk classification, risk weights and capital framework; a payment of Rs 2.03 crore to a former executive after he stopped working, which NRB directed be recovered (one outlet; a second report gives Rs 2.30 crore, which we could not reconcile). May 2025: not classifying non-performing loans as directed and not keeping the minimum loan-loss provision. November 2025: transactions allowed on the account of a person on a blacklist. Response: None found. Latest: The 2025 warning on loan classification is the one that bears on the NPL question in this file. Imposed: None (the Rs 2.03 crore is a recovery direction); claimed: Rs 2.03 crore to be recovered; recognised in the accounts: Not stated. Sources: ^44,45,46,47 Last checked 2026-10-18.
L05 Supreme Court order on directors and chief executives of warned banks (December 2024). Status: Writ dismissed; interpretive order of 4 Dec 2024. No sanction against anyone at Kumari stated. Role: Named respondent, with eight other banks and NRB. Forum: Supreme Court of Nepal, joint bench of Dr Nahakul Subedi and Nripadhwaj Niraula. Allegation: The writ asked for the removal of the boards and chief executives of the respondent banks on the ground that NRB sanctions made them ineligible. Response: No statement by Kumari or its chief executive found. NRB’s spokesperson said officials are not automatically disqualified. Latest: Concluded as to the writ; compliance by the bank is not reported. Imposed: none; claimed: none; recognised in the accounts: none. Sources: ^19,54 Last checked 2026-10-18.
L06 Income-tax reassessments of the bank and the institutions it absorbed. Status: Cases at the Supreme Court, the Revenue Tribunal and administrative review; amounts not disclosed. Role: Appellant (taxpayer). Forum: Supreme Court; Revenue Tribunal; administrative review. Allegation: The tax office reassessed several years. The bank has appealed each. A case on premium from the further public offering and gains from mergers and acquisitions is at the Supreme Court. Response: The bank has filed each appeal; the notes give no amount. Latest: Pending; amounts and probability not disclosed in the notes we read. Imposed: none; claimed: Not stated; recognised in the accounts: Not stated. Sources: ^8,5 Last checked 2026-10-18.
L07 An employee’s dispute with the bank after a hundi allegation (2026). Status: Supreme Court show-cause and interim order of 25 Aug 2026; the bank has filed its own writs. Role: Employer. Forum: Kathmandu District Court (criminal case); Supreme Court (writ). Allegation: The bank complained to police alleging hundi; Banking Sansar reports the district court acquitted the officer and the bank then cut her salary increment, which she challenged. Response: The bank filed writs against the interim order (reported). No public statement found. Latest: Pending. The criminal acquittal, the increment cut and the interim order are different proceedings. Imposed: none; claimed: Not stated; recognised in the accounts: none. Sources: ^52,53 Last checked 2026-10-18.
L08 A US$10 million foreign loan and a request to the CIAA (2026). Status: A request for investigation reported in June 2026; no case or finding found. Role: Borrower; the bank is not reported as accused. Forum: Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (request). Allegation: The advocate asked about the source and use of the funds and the beneficiaries; the report says the money-laundering angle is his suspicion. No wrongdoing is established. Response: None found. The bank’s earlier claim that it repaid the loan by July 2024 appears only in the 2026 reports. Latest: A press report of a request; no investigation by the CIAA is confirmed. A separate US$10 million loan from another lender (Microfinance Enhancement Facility) was announced in July 2023. Imposed: none; claimed: US$ 10 million; recognised in the accounts: Borrowings rose Rs 143.6 crore in the quarter to mid-October 2023 (unaudited; lender not named). Sources: ^48,49,50 Last checked 2026-10-18.
L09 A report that staff were told to hide loan files from inspectors (2026). Status: Single-outlet allegation, 2 June 2026; no finding or second source found. Role: Subject of the allegation; no finding against the bank. Forum: None found. Allegation: The report says an email told staff to hide files during an NRB inspection and that loans in recovery or auction were shown as active. The email is not reproduced. Response: A conditional remark by the bank’s information officer; no denial or confirmation found. Latest: Not corroborated. We note it because it concerns the same loan-classification question as the NPL figures above. It is not part of our conclusions. Imposed: none; claimed: none; recognised in the accounts: none. Sources: ⁵¹ Last checked 2026-10-18.
L10 A loan to a builder made by NCC Bank in 2010 (litigation and a 2026 complaint). Status: Supreme Court review granted 8 Aug 2025; a CIB complaint registered 18 Jan 2026; no finding. Role: Lender (inherited from NCC Bank); the chief executive says the bank is the victim and wants recovery. Forum: Lalitpur District Court (2019), Patan High Court (2023), Supreme Court (review); Central Investigation Bureau (complaint); Nepal Rastra Bank (complaint). Allegation: One article reports that NCC Bank lent Rs 7.62 crore in 2010 against land in Sanepa valued at Rs 13.26 crore, that the liability stood at Rs 12.52 crore, and that a complaint says a Rs 12.52 crore “good for payment” cheque was issued while the borrower was blacklisted. A separate complaint to NRB reportedly alleges a Rs 6.56 crore price difference was moved. Response: The people named in the article deny the allegations. The bank’s chief executive says the bank is the victim. The police spokesperson says the investigation is ongoing. Latest: Pending. This is one detailed report from one outlet; nothing was found from a court or from NRB itself. Imposed: none; claimed: Rs 12.52 crore outstanding (per the report); recognised in the accounts: Not stated. Sources: ⁵⁷ Last checked 2026-10-18.

Of the ten, two are concluded (the 2008 Supreme Court case and the December 2024 order), two are NRB sanctions already imposed, three are pending or in review, and three are unresolved because we found no outcome. The one court ruling that touches the bank (2008) dismissed the founding chairman’s petition over pre-opening expenses; it says nothing about today’s management. We found no other court finding against the bank or its directors.

What is not here. Matters that rest on a single report with no charge, no outcome and no second source, or that identify a private individual without a finding, are not on this page. They are kept in the research file as leads.

There is a theme, and it is ours, not a finding: loan files. The 2021 forged-title loan, the 2024 and 2025 NRB warnings on classification and provisioning, and the 2025 NRB warning on classification all concern how loans are valued, classified and documented. For a shareholder the question is not the Rs 1.1 crore of fines but whether the loan book is classified accurately.

Why this matters. The legal record is mostly small money and old matters. The matters that could affect value are the tax disputes (amounts not disclosed), any NRB supervisory consequence for the NPL gap, and the 2025 classification warning. We found no NRB finding on the 2026 allegations.

The record is thin on money. So what are the risks, and what does the bank have going for it?

10. What could go wrong, ranked, and what to watch

These are the risks for Kumari specifically, ranked by how much each could change the picture, with the evidence of exposure and what would change our view. The levels are our qualitative assessment.

Credit quality: two NPL figures and a 32% rise: HIGH. The notes to the audited accounts, repeated in the directors’ report, put non-performing assets at Rs 2,669.5 crore, 8.83% of loans, up 32% in a year on the restated comparative; the unaudited quarterly ratio was 7.46%. Provisions held against the NPA are Rs 2,068.8 crore (77%), and the bank released Rs 138.9 crore of provisions in the year. Under the broader accounting definition (unaudited), Stage 3 loans to customers are Rs 4,796.8 crore, 16.3% of gross customer loans; wholesale and retail and construction hold 48% of it. What would change our view: The audited ECL stage tables, the next quarter’s NPL on the same basis as the directors’ report, and recoveries (not disclosed); write-offs were Rs 106.9 crore.
Earnings quality: the profit rests on one line: HIGH. The release of loan-loss provisions explains 95% of the rise in pre-tax profit. Q4 alone supplied 43% of the unaudited year and contained a Rs 300.7 crore reversal. Had the line stayed at last year’s Rs 345.1 crore charge, pre-tax profit would have been about Rs 546.9 crore instead of Rs 1,030.9 crore (our arithmetic, before any tax effect). What would change our view: Quarterly impairment in the year to mid-July 2027: a second reversal, or a charge.
Capital and the rating: MEDIUM. Tier 1 capital was 9.87% and total capital 13.50% at 16 July 2026 in the audited notes (9.92% and 13.55% in the unaudited Basel disclosure). ICRA called the improvement in 2025 “mainly aided by various recent regulatory forbearances”, rated the bank BB+ and noted NRB’s tier-I minimum of 8.50% (the Rs 1,400 crore of subordinated debentures mature between 2030 and 2033). What would change our view: NRB’s forbearance rules, tier-I after the next dividend, and any ICRA review in 2026.
Dividend capacity: MEDIUM. Distributable profit was minus Rs 385 crore at mid-July 2025 and plus Rs 63.5 crore after the year (Rs 79.2 crore in the unaudited statement). The Rs 55.2 crore dividend is 87% of the audited figure. A smaller or a lower-quality profit would not repeat it. What would change our view: Distributable profit for the year to mid-July 2027, and NRB’s approval of this dividend (not seen).
Regulatory record: MEDIUM. NRB fined the bank Rs 50 lakh (February 2023, accounts of a money-laundering suspect) and about Rs 59 lakh (August 2023, credit-to-deposit ratio), and issued four warnings or directions in 2023, 2024 and 2025 (one reported twice). These are administrative sanctions, not court findings. In December 2024 the Supreme Court read the law to mean an NRB sanction can create a five-year ineligibility for the person sanctioned; it applied that to nobody at Kumari, NRB says officials are not automatically disqualified, and no removal has been ordered. What would change our view: Whether the warnings continue; and what the bank says about which sanction applied to which officer.
Integration and the network: LOW. The bank had 302 branches in July 2025 and 279 on 16 September 2026; staff fell from 3,296 (July 2023) to 2,946 over three years. The same book’s KPI table shows 326 branches and 336 ATMs at 16 July 2026, which we cannot reconcile with the September counts. The cause of the reduction is not stated in the sources we read. What would change our view: Branch and staff counts at the next report; whether the closures are mergers of overlapping outlets.

The strengths are real. The bank has 2,946 staff, deposits of Rs 40,273.6 crore, capital above the minimum, an independent director and a joint audit by two firms, and a first dividend after three years.¹ They are not a thesis; they are the platform the risks sit on.

Ask who paid for the size. Kumari’s paid-up capital grew 8 times in ten years, and about two-thirds of the rise (Rs 1,583 crore of Rs 2,296 crore) came from shares issued in the mergers; the rest came from rights and bonus shares. Between 2022 and 2025 profit fell, no dividend was paid, and book value per share dipped from Rs 142.76 to Rs 132.71 before recovering.^1,8
A line can be 95% of a change. Of the Rs 507.5 crore rise in pre-tax profit, Rs 484.1 crore is the swing in loan-loss provisions. Read the line that changed, not the headline.^1,5
The same number can appear twice with different values. The NPL ratio on one date is 7.46% in an unaudited quarterly table and 8.83% in the notes to the audited accounts. When two documents disagree, show both and say which one the audit touched.^1,4
Check where a figure comes from. A dividend of “21.053%” turned out to be a web address that dropped a decimal point. The company’s notice and minute said 2.1053%.^23,2
A headline is not an order. A site said the Supreme Court disqualified bank chief executives. The order dismissed the writ; it set a rule about NRB sanctions and named no sanction against anyone at Kumari.^19,54

If you were deciding what to ask, what would you ask first?

11. Eight questions an investor should ask

These are the questions the evidence raises, answered as far as the sources allow.

Is the Rs 736 crore profit what Kumari Bank earns in a normal year?

Probably not. Of the Rs 507.5 crore rise in pre-tax profit, Rs 484.1 crore is the swing in loan-loss provisions: a Rs 345.1 crore charge in the year to mid-July 2025 became a Rs 138.9 crore release. Net interest income, fees and trading income also rose, by Rs 39.2, 38.8 and 42.7 crore, but together they are about a quarter of the provisioning swing.^1,5 Whether provisions stay low depends on the loans, which is the next question.

Are the bad loans going up or down?

Up on the audited note (repeated in the directors’ report): non-performing assets Rs 2,669.5 crore against a restated Rs 2,026.9 crore a year earlier (Rs 2,031.8 crore as printed then), a rise of 32%, or 8.83% of loans.¹ The unaudited quarterly table shows 7.46% for the same date.⁴ The two cannot both be the NPL ratio under one definition, and the documents do not say what changed between them. Either way the ratio is higher than the 1.11% of mid-July 2022.⁹ In the directors’ report the bank holds provisions of 77% against it.

Did the mergers make shareholders richer?

In size, yes: assets went from Rs 4,241.7 crore in mid-July 2016 to Rs 49,168.1 crore, and paid-up capital is 8.0 times higher.^11,1 Per share is a different story. Book value was Rs 142.76 in mid-July 2022, Rs 132.71 in 2024 and Rs 170.71 now, including a provision release.^9,6,1 Three years had no dividend. The 2022 dividend was 12.5% cash; the next is 2.1053%.^9,2

Why did Kumari’s shareholders reject the NCC merger in 2016 and accept it in 2022?

We cannot say. The January 2016 plan was a six-way merger in which Kumari and NCC were each 100; Kumari’s special general meeting cancelled it, saying stakeholders were not satisfied with the swap ratio and that a return to shareholders would be hard for some years.^11,28 The 2022 swap was 1 : 1, the same ratio between the same two banks.^25,24 The filings do not say what had changed, and we did not find the 2022 valuation report.

Is the bank safe? What do the capital numbers say?

It meets the minimums. Capital fund was 13.50% in the audited notes and 13.55% in the unaudited Basel disclosure; Tier 1 was 9.87% (9.92% unaudited).^1,4 But ICRA rated the bank BB+ in January and September 2025, citing the industry’s highest gross NPA, tier-I capital below the minimum at the time, and a large gap between unaudited and audited profit.^21,22 Tier 1 at 9.87% in July 2026 is above that 8.50% minimum.

Are there court cases I should worry about?

The record is mostly small money and old matters. The Supreme Court decided one case about the founders’ expenses in 2008. NRB fined the bank about Rs 1.1 crore in 2023 and warned it four times from 2023 to 2025. Income-tax disputes with the tax office are pending, amounts undisclosed. A 2021 forged-title loan of about Rs 19 crore involved arrests, and one outlet reports eight private individuals sentenced in 2024. Apart from the 2008 ruling, nothing we found is a court finding against the bank or its directors.^18,42,5,41 The cases are in chapter 9, each with its exact status.

Can the dividend repeat?

It depends on distributable profit, which is not net profit. After reserves and the carried-forward loss, audited distributable profit is Rs 63.5 crore; the dividend of Rs 55.21 crore uses 87% of it.^1,2 A year with ordinary provisions and lower profit would leave less. NRB approval of this dividend was not found.

What would you ask the bank?

Four things the filings raise and do not answer. First, how a Rs 138.9 crore provision release squares with a 32% rise in non-performing assets: the provision under NRB norms fell from Rs 2,663.7 crore to Rs 2,519.7 crore, the same Rs 144 crore as the unaudited year’s release (Rs 138.9 crore after audit), and the bank books the higher of that and its accounting estimate.^3,1 Second, which loans and sectors took substandard loans from Rs 72.1 crore to Rs 620.0 crore in one year, 8.6 times.¹ Third, what happened in the fourth quarter: the first three quarters booked a Rs 156.7 crore charge and the fourth reversed Rs 300.7 crore.³ Fourth, what changed between the 7.46% and the 8.83%.^4,1

What does the evidence, taken together, support?

12. What is known, what is not, and what would change our mind

Before the numbers we set out four readings of Kumari Bank and what would tell them apart. Here is how each stands.

Reading of KBL	What supports it	What contradicts it	Our view
A scale story: mergers built a large bank that is now recovering	Assets 2.3 times in four years; profit Rs 736.3 crore; the dividend returns.	Per-share book value rose only 19.6% in four years; profit is mostly provisioning; NPL is 8 times its 2022 level.	Partly true: the bank is bigger. Whether it is stronger per share is not shown.
An earnings-quality story: reported profit overstates what repeats	95% of the rise in pre-tax profit is provisioning; NPA up 32%; two NPL figures; Q4 supplied 43%.	Net interest and fee income rose too; the quarterly NPL looked better than the report.	The best supported reading.
A governance and legal-overhang story	Repeated NRB warnings and two fines; tax cases at the Supreme Court; a 2021 loan against forged collateral at a branch.	Apart from the 2008 ruling, no court finding against the bank or its directors; the 2026 allegations are single-source; the matters with amounts are small.	Not shown to be material to the equity.
An integration-cost story: shareholders paid for scale	Three years without a dividend; book value per share fell before recovering; ICRA BB+.	The dividend has resumed; capital is above the minimum.	Supported for 2023 to 2025; the picture for 2026 is mixed.

Our interpretation of the evidence in this file. It is not a valuation. Our separate valuation asks what the share price assumes. ⁵⁶

Our view. Kumari is a larger bank than it was in 2022, with a thinner record per share, a profit in the latest year that is mostly a provision release, and two NPL figures for one date. The mergers are not a scandal; they are the explanation for the size and for the lean years. The earnings-quality reading is the best supported by the filings. Nothing here is a finding about the people who run the bank.

What would change our mind. (1) An audited ECL stage table and a reconciliation of the 7.46% and 8.83% would settle the NPL question. (2) A second year of low provisions with falling NPA would support the recovery reading. (3) An NRB statement on the warnings. (4) A court judgment or NRB finding in any matter in the register.

What we could not read or find	What we did	Status
Audited ECL stage tables for the year to mid-July 2026	Read the unaudited stage note; the audited book has no stage table in its English notes.	Not available
What changed between the 7.46% and the 8.83% NPL	Read both documents.	Not available
Company Registrar certificate; NRB licence date	Searched.	Not found
Valuation and due-diligence reports for the mergers; NEPSE and NRB notices	Searched.	Not found
NRB approval or payment of the 2.1053% dividend	Read the notice, minute and news.	Not found
NRB’s own notices for the fines and warnings	Read press reports of them.	Press only
A court judgment in the 2021 land-collateral case; any charge sheet	Searched in English and Nepali.	Not found
A CIAA registration for the 2026 complaint; any NRB finding on the 2026 allegations	Searched.	Not found
Outcome of the 7 October 2026 hearing in the employee case	Searched.	Not found
The bank’s comment on the 2026 allegations	Searched.	Not found
The full promoter register; beneficial owners	Not published.	Not available
Why the bank’s branches fell from 302 to 279	Read the reports.	Not stated

What depends on these items is marked “not disclosed in the sources we read” or “not found” on the page.

How do we know the numbers are right, and where do the sources disagree?

13. How we checked, and where sources differ

Primary documents carry the numbers: the 26th, 25th, 24th, 23rd and 22nd annual reports, the minute of the 26th annual meeting, the fourth-quarter statements and the Basel disclosure. Court and regulator documents are used where we could read them (the Supreme Court’s Nepal Kanoon Patrika page, the December 2024 order, ICRA Nepal rationales, NRB’s supervision reports). Press reports are used for dates and events the filings do not cover and are labelled as press. We set out a list of questions before research, kept a register of sources with the quote and our confidence for each claim, and recomputed from the filings the ratios that we derived ourselves (shares, changes and multiples). Ratios printed by the bank are shown as printed.

Nepali pages and scanned reports were read in the original from the page. Where a quotation or figure rests on one outlet or on an English-language edition only, we label it press or single-source and do not build a conclusion on it. Financial figures come from the filings; legal and regulatory amounts come from the press or court documents, as labelled.

Claim	Figure	Period	Sources	Status	Note
Net profit after tax	Rs 736.3 crore (Rs 7,362,677,610)	Year to mid-July 2026	¹	Verified	Audited, bank only. The unaudited statement showed Rs 738.7 crore; audit took about Rs 2.5 crore off.
Share of the rise in pre-tax profit that is provisioning	95.4% (Rs 484.1 crore of Rs 507.5 crore)	Year to mid-July 2026 against 2025	^1,5	Partially verified	The income-statement lines are printed; the share is our arithmetic. The 87.3% on the profit after tax is on a smaller base because tax also fell.
Non-performing assets, audited notes and directors’ report	Rs 2,669.5 crore, 8.83% of loans, up 31.7%	16 Jul 2026	¹	Verified	Note 5.2.4 to the audited accounts, repeated in the directors’ report and the five-year table. Our check: 26,694.8 divided by 302,385 is 8.83%.
Non-performing loan ratio, quarterly disclosure	7.46% (Rs 2,254.8 crore)	16 Jul 2026	⁴	Verified	Unaudited Basel disclosure. The Rs 414.7 crore difference from the audited note is unexplained in the documents we read.
Dividend	2.1053% cash, tax included: Rs 55.21 crore	14 Oct 2026	^2,23	Verified	Notice, signed minute and press agree. “21.053%” appears only in one web address. NRB approval and payment date not found.
Audited distributable profit	Rs 63.5 crore (Rs 635,182,992)	16 Jul 2026	¹	Verified	The unaudited statement in the same book shows Rs 79.2 crore. The dividend is 87% of the audited figure (our arithmetic).
Paid-up capital	Rs 2,622.59 crore; 8.0 times the mid-July 2016 level	16 Jul 2026	^1,11	Verified	Share-capital history note; the multiple is our arithmetic on Rs 326.6 crore in 2016.
Swap ratio, NCC Bank	1 : 1	26 Sep 2022 (MoU)	^25,8	Verified	The same 100 : 100 as the cancelled January 2016 plan; the reason the ratio was acceptable in 2022 is not in the documents.
Date NCC Bank joined	1 January 2023 (17 Poush 2079)		^8,6,7	Disputed	One note in the January 2025 file says 2024; the same report’s CEO note, the re-issue and the audited NCC accounts say 2023. We treat 2024 as a typing error.
Date of incorporation	10 December 1999 (24 Mangsir 2056)		^9,5,14	Disputed	The 25th report gives the opening date (3 April 2001) as the incorporation date. We did not see the registrar’s certificate.
Opening date	3 April 2001 (21 Chaitra 2057)		^14,17	Verified	First annual report and NRB’s list agree.
Internet banking in 2002	“The first bank to introduce internet banking in 2002”	2002	^16,36	Partially verified	The regulator’s sentence; the year is supported by the bank’s reports. “First” rests on the regulator’s word.
Supreme Court order of 4 December 2024	Writ dismissed; an NRB sanction creates a five-year bar	4 Dec 2024	^19,54	Partially verified	Read from the order copy hosted by Banking Sansar; not checked against the court’s register. No sanction against any Kumari officer is stated.
Reported sentencing in the case over the singer’s land	Eight people sentenced to one to four years	15 Jul 2024	⁴¹	Unverified	One outlet; no judgment text; no bank employee on its list.
NRB fines	Rs 50 lakh (8 Feb 2023); about Rs 59 lakh (Aug 2023)	2023	^42,43	Partially verified	Press reports of NRB’s releases; NRB’s own notices not read.
ICRA rating	Issuer BB+, debentures LBB+	27 Jan and 25 Sep 2025	^21,22	Verified	ICRA Nepal rationales. A 2026 rating action was not read.
Branches	302 (16 Jul 2025); 279 (16 Sep 2026)	2025 and 2026	^5,1	Verified	Why the count fell is not stated.
Promoter register	Holders above 1% named; promoters hold 51%	16 Jul 2026	¹	Not available	The full promoter list and beneficial owners are not published in the sources we read.

Where sources disagree	What we found	How we settled it
When did NCC Bank join?	One note in the January 2025 file of the 24th report says 1 January 2024; the 23rd report, the April 2026 re-issue and the 25th report say 1 January 2023 (17 Poush 2079).	January 2023. NCC’s audited accounts end on 16 Poush 2079 (31 December 2022), the former NCC chief executive is paid “from January 1, 2023”, and the first merged annual report already includes NCC. The 2024 date is a typing error.
When was the bank incorporated?	10 December 1999 in six annual reports; “21 Chaitra 2057 (3 April 2001)” in the 25th report.	Registered December 1999 on the bank’s own notes; opened 3 April 2001 on the first annual report and NRB’s list. We did not see the registrar’s certificate.
Is the dividend 2.1053% or 21.053%?	Every report and the bank’s own notice say 2.1053%; “21053” appears in one news web address, and we found no report that prints 21.053%.	2.1053% of paid-up capital, tax included: Rs 55.21 crore, which is Rs 2.00 a share after 5% tax (our arithmetic).
How much capital did the 2017 deal add?	News said Rs 164 crore; the audited addition was Rs 135.4 crore.	Rs 135.4 crore; the Rs 164 crore was the targets’ own paid-up capital before the swap.
Did the Supreme Court disqualify Kumari’s chief executive?	A headline said so. The order dismisses the writ and sets a rule on NRB sanctions; it names no sanction against anyone at Kumari.	No court has ordered his removal. We report the order, not the headline.
What did the 2008 Supreme Court case decide?	A study explainer says the court ordered the directors to repay Rs 1.5 crore.	The court refused to quash NRB’s directive; the judgment does not itself order repayment. The explainer’s citation page (1451) cannot be confirmed from the official page.
What is the NPL ratio?	7.46% (unaudited quarterly ratios) or 8.83% (directors’ report).	Unresolved. We show both and say which document is which; we do not know what changed between them.
Hearing on 21 October 2026?	An English report suggests a hearing in the employee case on 21 October; the Nepali date it renders is Asoj 21.	Asoj 21, 2083 is 7 October 2026, already past; no 21 October hearing is verified.

Corrections to this page will be listed here with the date they were made. First published 19 October 2026.

Term	What it means here
NPL, NPA	Non-performing loans or assets: loans where payments are overdue by NRB’s rules (substandard, doubtful, loss classes). The NPL ratio is these as a share of loans.
Stage 3, ECL	The accounting version of bad loans: “expected credit loss” accounting puts credit-impaired loans in Stage 3. It is a different measure from NRB’s NPL classes.
Impairment, provision	Money set aside against loans that may not be repaid. A charge lowers profit; a reversal (release) raises it.
Capital fund ratio, Tier 1	The bank’s loss-absorbing capital as a share of risk-weighted assets. NRB sets minimums (total 11% and Tier 1 8.5% in the documents we read).
Distributable profit	The profit a bank may pay out after NRB’s deductions and after recovering any accumulated loss. It can be negative even when the year’s profit is positive.
Swap ratio	How many shares of the acquiring bank each shareholder of the absorbed one receives, for example 85 Kumari shares for every 100 shares of a smaller institution.
Interest pooling, acquisition method	Two ways to record a merger. Pooling adds the books together with no goodwill; the acquisition method records the price paid and any goodwill.
Interest in suspense	Interest charged on a loan but not counted as income because it is not being paid.
BB+ (ICRA)	A below-investment-grade rating on ICRA Nepal’s scale: moderate risk of default.
SGM, AGM	Special and annual general meetings of shareholders.
Show-cause order	A court order asking a party to explain why a requested order should not be made. It is not a decision.
Hundi	An informal money-transfer system that is illegal when used outside the banking channels.

Plain-language definitions for this file; not legal or accounting advice.

What does this establish, and what comes next?

14. What this establishes, and what it does not

Kumari Bank reported a record audited profit of Rs 736.3 crore for the year to mid-July 2026, four times the year before.
95% of the rise in pre-tax profit is the swing from a loan-loss charge to a release, in a year when non-performing assets rose 32%.
The bank was assembled by absorbing six institutions in three deals; paid-up capital is 8.0 times its 2016 level, and shareholders went three years without a dividend after the NCC merger.
Two documents give two NPL figures for the same date: 8.83% (directors’ report) and 7.46% (unaudited quarterly ratios). We could not reconcile them.
Apart from the 2008 ruling dismissing the founding chairman’s petition over pre-opening expenses, we found no court finding against the bank or its directors in ten registered matters; the regulator’s sanctions are fines and warnings, and the allegations from 2026 are single-source.

Bought size. Booked relief. Two NPL numbers.

When a bank’s record profit is mostly a provision release, which year are you valuing: the one it reported, or the one it will repeat?

Which Nepali bank, or which merger, deserves the next KYC?

This research establishes how Kumari was assembled, the size of the merger cost to shareholders, the composition of the latest profit, the existence of two NPL figures, the board and management, and the legal record up to 18 October 2026. It does not establish whether the profit will repeat, why the two NPL figures differ, or the outcome of any pending matter.

The question that deserves the next episode is the loan book. What changed between 7.46% and 8.83%, and how much of the Rs 138.9 crore release is recovery rather than re-estimation? The audited ECL tables, the next quarter’s NPL on the same definition and an NRB statement on the 2025 warnings would answer it. Our valuation at /valuation/kbl-intrinsic-value asks what the price assumes about exactly this.

सारांश (नेपालीमा). कुमारी बैंकले २०५७ चैत २१ मा कारोबार सुरु गरी तीन सम्झौतामा छ वटा संस्था गाभ्यो। आर्थिक वर्ष २०८२/८३ को लेखापरीक्षित नाफा रु. ७३६.३ करोड हो, तर कर अघिको नाफा बढेको रु. ५०७.५ करोडमध्ये रु. ४८४.१ करोड (९५%) नोक्सानी व्यवस्था घटेकाले हो। एउटै मितिमा निष्क्रिय कर्जा अनुपात दुई थरी (८.८३% र ७.४६%) देखिएको छ। लाभांश २.१०५३% (रु. ५५.२१ करोड) हो, २१.०५३% होइन। २००८ को संस्थापक अध्यक्षको रिट खारेज भएको फैसला बाहेक बैंक वा सञ्चालकविरुद्ध अरू अदालती फैसला भेटिएन; विवरण स्रोतसहित माथि छ।

What the Kumari Bank price assumes: our valuation of KBL. Our residual income valuation of 14 October 2026, built on the numbers in this file.
KYC #05: Salt Trading Corporation (STC). Salt earns the money; interest takes most of it.
All Know Your Company files. Surya Nepal, Dabur Nepal, Bottlers Nepal, Shivam Cements, Salt Trading Corporation and Kumari Bank.

Sources & further reading

Primary sources

26th annual general meeting book, year to mid-July 2026: directors’ report, audited statements and notes, statement of distributable profit. Kumari Bank Limited, 14 Oct 2026.
Notice (22 Sep 2026) and minute of the 26th annual general meeting, 28 Ashwin 2083. Kumari Bank Limited, 14 Oct 2026.
Fourth-quarter 2082/83 interim statements (NFRS), unaudited: ratios, ECL stages, sector exposure. Kumari Bank Limited, Aug 2026.
Disclosure under Basel III at 16 July 2026. Kumari Bank Limited, Aug 2026.
25th Annual Report 2081/82: audited statements, notes, corporate-governance report. Kumari Bank Limited, Apr 2026.
24th Annual Report 2080/81: audited statements and notes (English-language file). Kumari Bank Limited, Apr 2026 re-issue.
24th Annual Report 2080/81, January 2025 file. Kumari Bank Limited, Jan 2025.
23rd Annual Report 2079/80: merger notes (1.1, 5.37), NCC Bank statements to 16 Poush 2079, goodwill. Kumari Bank Limited, Jan 2024.
22nd Annual Report 2078/79. Kumari Bank Limited, Jan 2023.
17th and 18th Annual Report (combined), 2073/74 and 2074/75. Kumari Bank Limited, undated on site.
16th Annual Report 2072/73: “Information regarding merger”. Kumari Bank Limited, Feb 2017.
Fourth Annual Report 2060/61: IPO result and first-years figures. Kumari Bank Limited, AGM 4 Apr 2004.
5th Annual Report 2061/62: shareholders holding more than 0.5%. Kumari Bank Limited, 2005.
First Annual Report 2057/58 (scanned, Nepali): chairman’s report. Kumari Bank Limited, AGM 24 Jan 2002.
Company website: About us and management team. Kumari Bank Limited, accessed 18 Oct 2026.
Bank Supervision Report 2025, section 3.12.1 (printed page 30). Nepal Rastra Bank, Jun 2026.
Annual Bank Supervision Report 2007 to 2010, Table 1.3 (commercial banks by operation date). Nepal Rastra Bank, 2010.
Nur Pratap J.B.R. v. Nepal Rastra Bank: decision 7899, NKP 2064 issue 11, writ 3615 of 2062 (certiorari and prohibition). Supreme Court of Nepal, Nepal Kanoon Patrika, decided 2 Jan 2008.
Order in writ 080-WO-1525, Madhukumar Chaulagain v. Nepal Rastra Bank and others. Supreme Court of Nepal (copy hosted by Banking Sansar), 4 Dec 2024.
Rating rationale: Kumari Bank Limited (issuer BBB+, debenture LBBB+). ICRA Nepal, Sep 2019.
Kumari Bank: ratings downgraded to BB+ and kept on watch with negative implications. ICRA Nepal, 27 Jan 2025.
Kumari Bank: ratings removed from watch with negative implications (BB+). ICRA Nepal, 25 Sep 2025.

Secondary sources

Kumari Bank Proposes 2.1053% Cash Dividend for FY 2082/83. ShareSansar, 16 Sep 2026.
Swap ratio of NCC Bank and Kumari Bank fixed at 1:1. ShareSansar, 22 Nov 2022.
NCC Bank and Kumari Bank sign agreement to merge at a swap ratio of 1:1. ShareSansar, 26 Sep 2022.
Kumari Bank convenes its SGM, endorses merger with NCC Bank. ShareSansar, 12 Dec 2022.
Kumari Bank begins joint transaction after acquisition of NCC Bank: 306 branches and Rs 26.23 arba paid-up capital. ShareSansar, 2 Jan 2023.
Special general meeting of Kumari Bank cancels its merger with NCC Bank and four others. ShareSansar, Jul 2016.
Kumari Bank, NCC Bank sign merger pact. The Kathmandu Post, 14 Jan 2016.
Five financial institutions merge, start joint operations. The Kathmandu Post, 2 Jan 2017.
Kumari Bank completes acquisition of Deva Bikas Bank. ShareSansar, Jul 2020.
Kumari Bank and four other BFIs to start joint operation after acquisition. ShareSansar, 2017.
KBL appoints Mr. Ram Chandra Khanal as CEO for a tenure of 4 years. ShareSansar, 27 Apr 2022.
Bad start for Kumari Bank. Nepali Times, 27 Oct 2000.
Going public (Kumari Bank IPO of Rs 15 crore, 18 December to 16 January). Nepali Times, 12 Dec 2003.
Can we bank on the Internet?. Nepali Times, 27 Feb 2004.
History of the Amatya land-collateral case (Nepali). Onlinekhabar, Jan 2022.
NRB starts on-site investigation on singer Amatya’s land collateral scam. myRepublica, Nov 2021.
Four arrested for Rs 190 million fraud. myRepublica, Nov 2021.
Money-laundering investigation begins in the singer’s land-collateral case (Nepali). Kantipur, 7 Dec 2021.
Eight people who took loans by forging the singer’s land sentenced to one to four years (Nepali). Basobaas, 15 Jul 2024.
NRB fines four banks for not blocking a money-laundering suspect’s accounts. Onlinekhabar, 8 Feb 2023.
NRB takes action against three banks. The Himalayan Times, 8 Aug 2023.
NRB takes action against these 8 commercial banks for violating NRB guidelines. ShareSansar, 21 Apr 2023.
NRB takes action against Kumari Bank over misuse of CEO facilities to risk classification. Banking Sansar, 2 May 2024.
Eleven financial institutions under NRB action (Nepali). Kantipur, 5 May 2025.
NRB takes action against two commercial banks (Nepali). Kantipur, 10 Nov 2025.
Kumari Bank signs loan agreement with EMF Microfinance Fund AGmvK (USD 10 million). ShareSansar, 3 Aug 2023.
Advocate approaches CIAA over Kumari Bank’s USD 10 million EMF loan. Artha Khabar, 4 Jun 2026.
Same complaint (English edition). Banking Sansar, Jun 2026.
Report alleging staff were told to hide loan files and that loans in recovery were shown as active. Banking Sansar, 2 Jun 2026.
Employee’s writ against the bank: show-cause and interim order. Banking Sansar, Aug 2026.
Follow-up report on the same employee dispute. Banking Sansar, Sep 2026.
Report that the Supreme Court has disqualified CEOs of banks that received NRB warnings. Banking Sansar, 2026.
Banking law case: Nur Pratap J.B. Rana v. Nepal Rastra Bank (NKP 2064), study explainer. Entertain Lawyers, n.d..
Our valuation of Kumari Bank: what Rs 241.60 assumes. The Finance Aftermath, 14 Oct 2026.
The Kumari Builders loan that won’t go away. Nepal News, 15 Sep 2026.

Historical sources

Checked 19 October 2026. Educational research, not investment advice.